**Work Document 01/2018 -T**

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Present and future of the common security & defence policy

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Índex

The Development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy: possible risks and pathways

Italian Contribution (Ce.S.I)

Presentation of the document

The European Commission Report dated 7th June 2017 States that security is one of the three priorities that cause the greatest concern to EU citizens and that over 75% of Europeans are in favour of a common defence policy. The President of the Commission himself, Jean Claude Juncker, stated when he presented the document that «the right to feel secure and protected in your own home is the most basic and universal right of all». The highly destabilising events that have taken place in recent times such as the Arab Springs, Russian intervention in Crimea and Ukraine, the sharp increase in Jihadist terrorism within the European Union and beyond, or the migratory crises have caused in Europe, a growing sense of being besieged that is making us modify our approaches to security.

The terrorist attacks in recent years in Europe, have served as a rude awakening to those who did not view security as a key and basic issue for guaranteeing stability and development, from citizens to politicians, mainly, because there had not been a real and close threat. When terror reached European soil, European citizens came to realise that the EU did not have one basic support to protect them and guarantee their well-being.

Therefore, Europe is faced with the dilemma of what to do to restore the order of security along its boundaries and how to bring this about. That is to say, to define a consistent strategy that on the basis of risk analysis, pinpoints the objectives that are to be achieved, the way to achieve them and the resources that are required to do so. This debate is now going on in the heart of the European organisations and institutions associated with security and defence, and it also forms part of the political debate within the States. In recent years, all European States have been redefining their security strategies presenting them in the form of White Papers on Defence (FR. GE, IT) or National Security Strategies (RU, SP) in order to defend their own approaches to security.

The truth is that we are at the centre of a major debate on European security in which an attempt is being made to decide where to place that security's centre of gravity: in the east or in the west. This debate is very important for the future of European defence, and also for the security of the States, given that behind this a decision must be taken concerning where to put European strategic priorities and, consequently, where to make the Europe's main defence effort and allocate resources.

Spain is also participating in this debate aware of what is at stake and that, in this area, the sensitivities and interests of the European States vary greatly from one to another. Thus, for the countries in Eastern Europe, their main security concerns revolve around Russia, which is traditionally considered to pose the main threat. By contrast, the principle worries for the countries in Southern Europe. Spain included,

lie in the south and, essentially, in North Africa, which runs as far as its southern limits with the Sahel.

Spain's approach to security on the European continent is based upon the premise that Spain is prepared to make a supportive contribution to the defence of our members and allies, it being understood that they will do the same regarding the threats coming from the South.

In this sense, our main cause for concern is that if European security is excessively preoccupied with the East, this mean that we are confronting the Russian Bear and forgetting that the jackals are lying in wait in the South. The terrorist attacks in recent years that have directly affected Central European countries, the migration crises arising from the conflicts just below Europe's southern boundaries, together with others problems such as those associated with organised crime, frontier management, or the need to stabilise the bordering countries have modified, to the benefit of those who argue for the position of the Southern States, the perception of security for the citizens of the EU as a whole, which until recently was insensitive to and security concerns other than the Russian threat. However, the imbalance between the Eastern and the Southern orientations of European security are still excessive.

In this work we are assuming that the future of our security necessarily involves strengthening the still incipient mechanisms in the EU. The new Global Strategy on Foreign Policy and European Union Security submitted in June 2016 to the European Council by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, is a positive step in the sense that it sends a message of unity and projection towards the future at a time when Europe is being affected by an increase in populisms, internal contradictions and a lack of joint action when facing international problems and providing answers to the basic interests of the EU as a regional power, as well as the role it must play internationally. This is all the more necessary when the United States of America, hitherto the keystone in European security, is changing its strategic approaches, making us look towards Pacific Asia where the growth of China and other powers is beginning to cast aspersions on its international leadership.

We are now in a position to boost European cooperation especially in the field of security and defence, in view of the fact that the possible exit of the United Kingdom, which has traditionally shown its opposition to any European progress in this area, has unblocked the current impasse. We believe that, in the times of Brexit, of populisms, of the strategic distancing of the United States and the increase in threats to European security in the East and in the South, the European Union has to be strengthened and must concentrates on its own interests and on those of its citizens, and has to be prepared to play a pragmatic and active role on the international scene, and even play a leading role in such aspects as regional security, climate change or migrations.

In this sense, the present work is the result of a joint reflection carried out by the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos IEEE) and the Centro Studi Internazionali

(Ce.S.I.) of Italy in the year 2017. This first edition of the cooperation between the two institutions focuses on the «Present and future of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU», a subject considered of great importance for both countries given the transnational nature of the risks and dangers facing the European Union and whose effects end up being felt both in Italy and in Spain. We also consider very important to approximate positions among countries that share similar security concerns at a time when the European Union is beginning to redefine its Common Security and Defense Policy a process that will have far-reaching consequences for Europe's security.

This reflection work was developed in two phases. In the first, researchers from each Institute prepared a study´s paper on the chosen topic. The second phase was conducted through the elaboration of common conclusions that have been incorporated into this work.

With regard to obtaining information, open sources have been used exclusively, taking advantage, in our case, of the capabilities offered by the Documentation Service of CESEDEN, which has been a fundamental element when providing information from reliable and accredited sources. To this end, it has been tried to reference all the data provided in order to clearly distinguish what is information, from what corresponds to the analysis and opinion. In short, it has been sought to elaborate, with a wide European vision, a balanced, professional and quality document. The result produced should serve to promote the necessary debate within our societies and academic circles and to help our decision makers to reach the appropriate decisions about an aspect as important to our citizens as it is the future of Europe's security.

Madrid, January 12, 2018

Present and future of the common security & defence policy

Spanish Contribution (IEEE)

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Abstract

In this work, we analyse the need to develop European Union Security & Defence Policy in the face of new risks and threats that lie ahead basically in Southern Europe and with the consequences that Brexit might bring.

Permanent Structured Cooperation, collaboration and cooperation between States, and a relationship with NATO in which strategic autonomy is guaranteed all play an important role.

Keywords

European Union, Security, Defence, PESCO, Strategic Autonomy, NATO.

Introduction

Security is like oxygen: it can't be seen,

but you don't notice it until it's not there[1]

The International Security Context

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), integrated into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), ought to be implemented in a Europe where the citizens' main concern is the insecurity and where different scenarios come together in its strategic environment that put to the test not only the soft power that Europe prides itself upon, but also the strategic skill to successfully face up to the different crisis situations.

When we talk of Europe, we are referring to a large continent that basically forms part of a European Union consisting of 500 million Europeans and 28 countries (the United Kingdom has not yet left as a result of the Brexit decision) where internal crises occur, both of an economic nature and as a result of a lack of identity as Europeans. The consequences of these crises have not only been Brexit, but also an increase in Eurosceptic parties and a lack of coordination between member countries, in such sensitive matters as security and defence. A qualitative and quantitative step forward in the European integration project will only be achieved if the European Union manages to become a genuine security actor.

The EU has one basic geopolitical position. We are surrounded by the greatest number of armed and open conflicts in the world at present: from Ukraine to Afghanistan, including Syria and Iraq, plus the Arab-Israeli conflict further south and as far as Somalia.

If we analyse the European security environment from a geographical perspective, we can see how our security frontiers have been breached since the start of this decade, and large gaps have appeared in what the Ancient Romans called frontier *limes*, mainly in three areas: in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East and in the central Mediterranean extending as far as the Sahel. As a result, the comfortable security situation that we enjoyed a few years ago has disappeared and the risks and threats that we thought were so far away have now reached our frontiers, in such a way that their effects, in the form

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[1]   Mr. José María Muriel Palomino, Ambassador in Special Mission for Human Rights, Democracy, Rule of Law. Lecture given in Adesyd, Madrid 7/6/2017

of terrorism, large-scale migration or organised crime, make themselves felt within our boundaries.

When we consider the international panorama in recent times, we can see that in the 1990s, the main transformation factor was the end of the Cold War, whereas in the first decade of this century it was the 11th September 2001, with its consequent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The next few years are characterised by the repercussions of what was known as the Arab Spring, the strategic withdrawal of the USA, the rise of the new powers, basically China and India, the decline of Europe and the re-emergence of Russian irredentism. At the same time, extensive regions in Eastern Europe, the Far and Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa and the Sahel, have become sources of permanent instability caused by the rapid changes they are being subjected to as a result of social demands, ideological and religious tendencies and the growth of nationalism.

Although it is unlikely that the USA can be replaced by another global power, the world in the coming years will have ceased to be unipolar. The growth of national power in the new emerging powers, is shaped by a new «multipolar» international order, in which no State will be dominant. At the same time, in an unstoppable process, geopolitics is shifting the world's centre of gravity towards the Asia-Pacific Region, where the rise of China and India is reshaping the world order and redefining the strategic priorities of the major powers. It is in this zone and, to a lesser extent, in other zones where its interests, territorial controversies, competition for vital resources, etc. are key, where the future of the world and the supremacy that the USA has held to date will be settled.

The trends in international security in the coming years indicate that, rather than having to face clearly defined individual threats, it will be necessary to confront a wide range of risks caused by the emergence of new powers with global ambitions, competition for resources, the arrival of new non-state stakeholders, the technology boom, or the disturbance brought about by belonging to a global and interdependent security system.

Furthermore, low-intensity conflicts will still be the general trend for the next few decades, spreading across the surface of the planet in all shapes and forms with respect to their duration, the geographical extent of the operations and the ideology of the fighters. Nevertheless, the ever-increasing military expenditure of countries such as China, India or Russia and the uncertainty hovering over the eventual results of certain a transformation processes in the Arab World, mean that conflicts which are currently low intensity, could flare up into open confrontations in the future.

Turkey is another stakeholder that is a cause for concern to be taken into account by the EU, given that its aspirations to be an empire once again are still making their presence felt in the policy of its Government, distancing the country from the requirements needed to form part of the EU. Yet relations with Turkey must be

maintained if we wish to achieve a stable security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Neither must it be forgotten that 70% of Turkish exports go to Europe.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Europe is facing an America where transatlantic ties are not going through their best moments, but these bonds must be kept however weak they may seem. Probably the US President's requirements that Europe looks after its own security, should be seen as an opportunity for a Europe that is far too accustomed to protecting itself under the American umbrella. However, the EU ought to be working towards and developing its CSDP aware of the fact that US foreign policy walks alone on the path to security. The two organisations are compatible, because on the one hand the USA wants to gradually withdraw and, on the other hand, the European Union wishes to progressively take responsibility for its own defence[2].

The geopolitical tension generated by nuclear powers like Iran or North Korea, cybernetic attacks or political changes taking place in Latin America also add to the problem.

One worrying factor in the East is Russia, which now has a direct frontier with the European Union. It has annexed Crimea and is exerting considerable pressure on the Baltic States. Russia is a leading player on the world chessboard stakeholder that is mentioned by the deceased Zbigniew Brzezinski[3] and which leaves its mark with its implicit or explicit alliances with Iran or Syria, amongst others. The European Union has no alternative but to consider Russia in its geostrategic plans, in view of Russia' wish to regain their status as an international power and their proximity, coupled with the fact that the EU and Moscow have trade relations: around 40% of the EU's gas comes from Russia. The great fear of the EU, and especially the States bordering on Russia, is that the occupation of Crimea and the intervention in Ukraine might have set a precedent for similar actions that could be taken against other European countries.

In this sense, the responsibility for security in the East rests mainly with NATO, which devised a contention strategy at the Wales Summit (2014) and the Warsaw Summit (2016) that was sufficiently consistent. Furthermore, this strategy contained suitable response mechanisms to ensure that such events as Crimea and Ukraine cannot be repeated in other European countries.

2   http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_trabajo/2016/DIEEET08-2016_Arquitectura_Security. pdf. Miguel Angel Benedicto, ¿La arquitectura de seguridad internacional, un proyecto en quiebra? (*The architecture of international security, a project in meltdown?*) Page 63.

3   Zbigniew Brzezinski, «El gran tablero mundial: La supremacía estadounidense y sus imperativos geoestratégicos» (The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives) .Grupo Planeta (GBS), 1998.

In the South, there has been great disappointment over the consequences of the Arab Springs, which have yielded unexpected and negative results when compared to what was expected. The desired transformations have not materialised, in fact the opposite has taken place: the intrastate and interstate tensions have worsened, reaching a considerable level of violence in some countries. The political, economic and social structures of countries that were once thought to be stable, have crumbled to the extent that they have become failed States. Libya epitomises this situation, but it also applies to Syria, Yemen and Iraq.

Apart from the peripheral zones to the south of Europe, we have witnessed how the Sahel has become an increasingly insecure region, to the extent that the southern limits of this zone have become the most far-flung outpost for European security. Keeping the Maghreb stable, strengthening security in the Sahel and pacifying Libya are currently the three major European security challenges from a Spanish perspective, and define the limits of the efforts that Europe is prepared to make in order to secure the stability of these regions. As we have already seen with the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 or the more recent ones in Barcelona in August 2017, there is a close relationship between the terrorist groups that come from or settle in those countries, and their criminal activities within our boundaries.

Keeping the southern frontier of the EU is of vital importance, which means that countries like Egypt, Algeria and Morocco have become indispensable strategic partners. In view of the rivalry between these States, the cooperation relations that have been forged simultaneously and independently with them must endeavour to make the Mediterranean a stable region.

All in all, the EU's security equation is easy to formulate: the more stable and secure the countries bordering the EU are, both to the South and the East, the more stable and secure we will be. Therefore, all the regional measures and initiatives that contribute to this end, must be oriented towards benefitting European security and have to be supported by all the Member States.

In the context that has been outlined, the EU has to prioritise the main risks and threats to the security of Europe, already pinpointed in the Global Strategy of June 2016 and must decide on the resources and capacities with which it ought to equip itself to deal with this situation. It is not an easy task in view of the fact that the EU does not possess certain unique and specific characteristics. Rather than being a mere intergovernmental organisation the European Union is a political structure under permanent construction where, until the present time, economic union has been the most clearly visible aspect. As a result, it is now more necessary than ever before to draw up a coherent security and defence policy, one that is comprehensive and credible adapted to the security challenges that a changing world poses to the Union. The time has come to develop the pillar of security and defence as one of the basic jurisdictions, placing it within the field of the EU's jurisdictions.

Evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy

Historical Background

On other occasions the EU has tried to erect and strengthen the pillar of security, all the more so given that it is one of the basic foundations in the construction of the European Union, but the lack of a real threat and the convenience of feeling safe under NATO, meant that it was a subject that received little attention. Since the 1950s there have been several attempts to establish a Common European Defence Policy, but it was never possible to devise an effective one, which is an indication of the lack of interest that the Union had in these matters. Nevertheless, it is true to say that those first steps were taken by only 6 States[4], which had the advantage of being able to reach an agreement and share visions and targets. That situation had nothing to do with the efforts being made now with as many as 28 Member States, which have very different interests and viewpoints.

A few minor steps were taken in the crisis management area, such as the Petersberg Tasks[5] in 1992. It was in that city that an agreement was reached to create a space for military collaboration coordinated with NATO, in order to carry out its tasks involved in humanitarian or peace missions.

It was probably the Saint-Malo meeting in December 1999 between France and Great Britain[6], which gave the impetus for the CSDP to progress. At that meeting, the positions of both leaders, made it clear that it was necessary to progress towards a common policy with structures to anticipate and deal with crises, while at the same time counting on NATO as an almost basic resource for the defence of Europe, which is what the two great leaders at that meeting wanted, i.e. the leaders of France and Great Britain. The situation was very different from the current one. This compromise between the two distinct positions, Europeanist and Atlanticist, meant the beginning of a road to unity.

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4   The aim of the European Defence Committee is to achieve union for Europe in matters concerning security and defence. However, the treaty was not ratified by the French National Assembly so it did not come into force.

5   http://www.editorialfajardoelbravo.es/articulos/militares/capacidades.pdf.

6   SANTÉ, J. María: «La evolución histórica de la seguridad europea.» (The Historical Development of European Security). CESEDEN Monographs, Number 71. Available at http://bibliotecavirtualdefence.es/BVMDefence/i18n/catalogo_imagenes/grupo.cmd?path=17039.

The Cologne Summit in 1999[7] where Javier Solana was appointed High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy «Mr PESC»[8], amounted to a major step forward for the CSDP, with the creation of the so-called Headline Goal[9], where the EU Member States were asked to voluntarily deploy a joint force of 60,000 men with military skills in the Petersberg Tasks, through which it would be possible to pursue «more humanitarian» ways of keeping peace, non-executive missions or missions where peace could be restored utilising these Petersberg tasks.

The EU sought an instrument to achieve this: the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM)[10]. Later on, in the Laeken Summit in 2001 the "European Capabilities Action Plan" (ECAP) was created being replaced by the "Capabilities Development Plan" (CDP) in 2008. This mechanism establishes three catalogues:

1. Requirements Catalogue: finding the skills that are required to achieve the objective

2. Force Catalogue: skills offered by the Member States.

A third one emerges as a combination of the two:

3. Progress Catalogue: deficiencies pinpointed after comparing supply and demand.

Furthermore, a series of permanent structures was created for the benefit of security within the EU: the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).

The Headline Goal objective was a good starting point for cooperation between States in favour of a common defence, but it came up against several obstructions. The first of these was the lack of commitment among the various States: Who was going to provide the air resources? Who was going to provide the control or intelligence systems? None of the countries had them. Setting up a General Headquarters was considered as a solution. It would coordinate and agglutinate these resources as much as possible. However, this remedy was not implemented because of the opposition of Great Britain. Now, with Brexit and thus Great Britain out of the Union, an opportunity has appeared and it seems that Mogherini does not want to waste it.

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7   http://www.Europerl.Europe.eu/summits/hel1_es.htm.

8   https://Europe.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1990-1999/1999_es.

9   https://www.consilium.Europe.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.

10   https://www.consilium.Europe.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20EU%20Military%20Capabilities%20-%20May%202003.pdf.

Steps forward were still being taken and the declaration of the European Security Strategy in 2003[11], was a clear demonstration of how important it was for Europeans to have a peaceful and secure Europe, committed and prepared to be more active increasing capacities for a greater and better defence, all the more so after the September 11 attacks. This led to the creation of the European Defence Agency[12] (EDA) in 2004 with a view to improving the defence mechanisms for the EU, which plays an increasingly important role. One of its main aims is to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence, which is a complex task because national interests are mixed with European interests. A good example of this is the 7 types of frigates that Europe has when compared with the 3 types possessed by the USA: one of the EDA's tasks will be to try and unify and reduce the number, which is a complex task given that this means taking decisions that involve and go against certain national interests.

The Treaty of Lisbon in 2009[13], brought about several changes in the CSDP. On the one hand, greater powers for the Union's High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Policy, who is also the Vice President of the European Commission and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council; on the other hand it turns the EDA into a key institution of the CSDP, as long as it bestow upon it a «sound legal foundation and explicitly endorses its activities in the area of providing it with the skills, resources and equipment that the EU requires to implement this policy[14].

The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)

The European Union Global Strategy[15] establishes five priorities that, even if they are not really new, do provide a less ideological approach based upon the values as well as more realistic, based upon interests. This fresh approach is a consequence of the new awareness of security that has been instilled in Europe as a result of the recent

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11   Available at https://www.consilium.Europe.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIES.pdf.

12   Web: https://www.eda.Europe.eu/.

13   Available at http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/1292338956839?blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadername2=SuplementosBoletin&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3DTratado_de_Lisboa.PDF&blobheadervalue2=1215327821103.

14   Martí Sempere, Carlos «La Agencia Europea de Defensa tras el Tratado de Lisboa» (The European Defence Agency after the Treaty of Lisbon) Real Instituto Elcano. http://realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/!ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPykssyoxPLMnMzovMAfGjzOKNg318fEKcHX1NTZz-9QgKNXI0NDSBAvyDbUREAbgoKqw!!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari33-2008.

15   See at https://Europe.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_es_version.pdf.

terrorist attacks and the invocation by France in November 2015, of the EU's mutual assistance clause contained in Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty[16], something hitherto unprecedented. It is no longer a question of defining «a secure Europe in a better world» as was indicated in the previous strategy, but rather a need to create a stronger Europe, in circumstances in which «our Union is under threat»[17] as is explained in the new one. Along these lines, the EU's security because the principle priority, which means that there is a need to create the ability to project and protect, i.e., to strengthen the EU's crisis management structures and to equip them with suitable civil military capacities, including the rational and synergic strengthening of the defence industry.

Furthermore, the document substantially modifies its view with respect to the countries that are neighbours of the EU. It no longer seeks «to promote a series of well-governed countries» as it did in 2003, but to increase the resilience of the States and their societies, without attempting to impose the European model and basing itself on the local actors.

This pragmatic change in approach to the exterior is closely linked to the immigration crisis and is already being applied in the context of the new European immigration policy with agreements having been signed with 5 African States (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal)[18], together with the European foreign investment plans aimed at boosting the economies of the countries that the immigrants come from and pass through. As a result, the efficient multilateralism of 2003 has come to be pragmatism of principles in 2016.

Regarding the generation of political instruments of an operational nature oriented towards action, the final chapter entitled «from vision to action» constitutes an unprecedented advance when compared to the earlier documents, because it establishes a roadmap for implementing the strategy. –The idea is to encourage European participation especially in the field of security and defence, in view of the fact that the eventual departure of the United Kingdom, the country that has traditionally acted against any European progress in this field, has unblocked this stalemate situation.

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16   Art. 42.7: «If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression within its territory, the rest of the Member States must help and assist it, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is understood without affecting the specific nature of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area will continue to adapt to the commitments taken on within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which for the latter's members, will continue to form the basis of their collective defence and the body for implementing this» https://www.boe.es/doue/2010/083/Z00013-00046.pdf.

17   «Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy», http://eeas.Europe.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

18   http://Europe.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm.

The Bratislava Summit on 16th September 2016[19], the first with 27 members and minus the United Kingdom, indicates that there will be greater progress in this direction.

On a political level the Global Security Strategy joins forces with the general consensus about the need to guarantee the development of societies, because the facts show that without development there is no security and that violence is caused too often by this lack of development: lack of democratic governments, education, employment, basic resources, etc. Therefore, it is essential that Europe moves from soft security to hard security, in spite of what this involves where sacrifices are concerned: it means changing awareness, granting sovereignty and money.

Be that as it may, it is easier to talk about integration on paper than to put it into practice, bearing in mind the fact that most of the Member States, mainly in Northern Europe, are reluctant to intensify cooperation in defence matters. An added complication is the traditional ideological division between Europeanists and Atlanticists as regards a definition of the intensity and scope of the EU's strategic autonomy as opposed to NATO, without forgetting the weight of the spheres of influence of the United States.

Furthermore, there is no point in talking about autonomy in countries whose security basically depends on US guarantees and that repeatedly prove to be unable to comply with the commitments they have taken on to increase their defence budgets to 2% of their GDP, which is a commitment currently fulfilled only by the United Kingdom, Romania, Greece, Estonia and Poland. Aware of this state of affairs, and in spite of the mistrust that still prevails between the two institutions, all European countries agree in stressing the complementary nature of the relationship between the EU and NATO. Until the European Union is able to free itself from US protection, there is no point in talking about European strategic autonomy.

That is why it is so urgent for the EU to be more involved in security and defence matters, because the times of peace and prosperity that Solana spoke about «Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure or so free»[20] have come to an end, so, it is time to find a solution to the security threats faced by the EU and to prevent the emergence of new risks that could destabilise the continent.

Europe has always grown in the face of crisis and the time has come to do this again. They served to carry on making progress since almost the beginning of the Common Market, when the ECSC was set up as a reaction against the 2nd World War. That proved to be the right vehicle for create the idea of Europe that Robert

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19   Bratislava Declaration: file:///C:/Users/Asus/Downloads/160916-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmap-es.pdf.

20   European Security Strategy 2003. https://www.consilium.Europe.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIES.pdf.

Schumann envisaged in his Declaration on 9ᵗʰ May 1950 with a view to encouraging the Old Continent which was exhausted after two devastating World Wars: «World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it»[21].

Once again Iraq, the Balkans, Libya, Georgia, Ukraine, etc. are examples where Europe had its opportunity where defence was concerned but showed major internal divisions, a lack of consensus, unit and the need for a supranational body like NATO to deal with crises that are geographically in Europe, because Europeans have been unable to do so. However, if the Saint-Malo Agreements, between France and Great Britain, laid the foundations for exterior action, the Global Security Strategy presented by Mogherini, is another vehicle for setting in motion the Security and Defence Policy. The High Representative arrived with a Strategy on which had been worked on for many months, just when Europe was going through a serious and institutional crisis, because Brexit had occurred. It did not receive a very warm reception, but the recommendations and the progress of the negotiations, have given the EUGS a major role serving as the link in a fragile Europe that appeared to be breaking apart. Amongst other questions, the EUGS, sets out the guidelines for achieving a degree of strategic autonomy and for forging a sound Common Security and Defence Policy.

Europe also managed to turn the US President Donald Trump's visit to its own advantage. Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor herself, proclaimed that the EU's future is, now more than ever, in our own hands[22], in such a way that perhaps the time has come for the United States to stop solving our security and defence problems for us, all the more so with its nuclear power. Up until now we had left security matters in its hands, to the extent that European society had assumed and accepted that NATO, and the United States in particular, were the only ones that could defend us, in such a way that we had assimilated the message of a security and defence culture that was exclusively American.

The EUGS offers us the means for the two organisations to cooperate together, each one in its sphere of activity and it gives us some of the guidelines for going on from being security consumers to being security providers. An arduous task, but we are equipped with the resources, the skills and the will for having a greater strategic autonomy by cooperating with the NATO without excessive overlapping. How does this come about?

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21   https://www.robert-schuman.eu/es/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-204-es.pdf.

22   http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/05/28/592b15cfe5fdea69588b45de.html.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

First and foremost, the necessary progress and development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); an issue that has always been there but has not been put into operation until now, probably because it had not been considered necessary, in view of the lack of real «threats» such as the ones now faced.

This type of cooperation opens the floodgates for a series of mechanisms with which to make great advances in the construction and development of the CSDP. To be specific, it establishes in Articles 42.6[23] and 46[24] of the Lisbon Treaty, naming those countries that are prepared to participate in the development of capacities and in

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23   «The Member States that fulfil higher military capacity criteria and that have signed commitments that are more binding in the material to undergo the most demanding missions will establish an permanent structured cooperation within the framework of the Union» Available at https://www.boe.es/doue/2010/083/Z00013-00046.pdf.

24   «1. The Member States that wish to take part in the permanent structured cooperation mentioned in Section 6 of Article 42, comply with the criteria and take on the commitments in matters concerning military capabilities that appear in the Protocol regarding permanent structured cooperation will inform the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy about their intention. 2. Within a period of 3 months as from the notification referred to in Section 1, the Council will adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and the list of the participating Member States will be established. After consulting the High Representative, the Council will decide by qualified majority. C 83/40 Official Journal of the European Union 30.3.2010 ES 3. Any Member State that subsequently wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation, must notified its intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council will adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned, confirming that it fulfils the criteria and that it has taken on all the commitments envisaged in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol regarding permanent structured cooperation. After consulting the High Representative, the Council will decide by qualified majority. Only the Council members that represent the participating Member States will take part in the voting. The qualified majority will be defined in compliance with Letter a) of Section 3 of Article 238 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 4. If a participating Member State no longer complies with the criteria or can no longer take on the commitments envisaged in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol regarding permanent structured cooperation, the Council may decide to suspend that State's participation. The Council will reach such a decision by qualified majority. Only the Council members that represent the participating Member States will take part in the voting, minus the representative of the Member State concerned. The qualified majority will be defined in compliance with Letter a) of Section 3 of Article 238 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 5. If a participating Member State decides to leave the permanent structured cooperation, it will inform the Council about its decision, and the latter will make a note of the fact that the Member State in question has ceased to participate. 6. The Council's decisions and recommendations within the framework of permanent structured cooperation must be adopted unanimously, except for the ones envisaged in Sections 2 to 5. For the purpose of applying this section, the term «unanimously» will consist only of the votes cast by the representatives of the participating Member States». Available at https://www.boe.es/doue/2010/083/Z00013-00046.pdf.

the deployment of European military missions, more rapidly and more closely[25]. The idea does not involve 27 Members working on the same decisions, it is rather seeking points in common through this mechanism in order to increase European military capacity with the sum of all contributors.

Last March, in the Rome Declaration, reference was made to a «committed Union strengthened by its common security and defence, which also cooperates with and is complementary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, taking into account national circumstances and legal commitments; a Union that is active within the United Nations and that is in favour of a multilateral system based upon standards, proud of its values and a protector of its people, which promotes free and fair trade and a global climate policy»[26].

In spite of the fact that it had been written since 2009, it had never been used or given any special attention, precisely because it highlighted the idea of a «Two-Speed Europe» about which there are certain misgivings. However, in Europe we already have situations where not all the Members participate: only 19 States form part of the Euro (Great Britain does not) or the Schengen Agreement, which does not include certain countries, yet the projects have gone ahead. The deep crisis that has Europe has experienced, could be smoothed over by the CSDP, and it could be the key to putting the EU back on the track of unity, just when it appeared to be drifting away from it.

And if there is cooperation and coordination where these matters are concerned, we consider that it will be very likely as well as very positive if the PESCO can be developed and carried out, «transparently, participatively and inclusively»[27] letting countries join voluntarily. The driving force currently consists of Germany, France, Italy and Spain. They are all countries with ambition and capacities in defence, prepared to make this project a success. The Eastern European States are more reluctant, because although they are in favour of the Europe of Defence, their recent history and their frontiers make them more inclined to trust NATO with the defence of Eastern Europe, as it is a stable organisation, with experience and an ability to act quickly that the EU has yet to develop. Germany, Italy, France and Spain are the countries that have so far shown interest in setting in motion the Permanent Structured Cooperation, as is demonstrated in the meetings held with Mogherini throughout 2016-2017 and the clear way she has opted to develop the PESCO to guarantee the functioning of the

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25   https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305683915_La_Cooperacion_Estructurada_Permanente_propuestas_para_Espana.

26   file:///C:/Users/Asus/Downloads/25-rome-declaration.es.pdf.   ROME   DECLARATION 25/3/2017.

27   Mogherini, Federica. Declarations about the PESCO. 17/5/2017 http://www.Europepress.es/internacional/noticia-28-esperan-acordar-cooperacion-estructurada-defence-antes-posible-definiran-criterios-junio-20170518181245.html.

CSDP. However, although the four are States with great capacities, it is undoubtedly the case that the Franco-German axis is back together with a view to maintaining a predominant position in the Europe of Defence.

Why do we need to put the PESCO into operation?

Firstly, because one single voice creates a sense of European cohesion and identity. At present, when the European Union attends international summits, it does not do so as a Union. The Member Countries attend and defend their positions in an individual way. One single union that is strong in defence, would require the voice of the European Union to be the voice of all the 27 Member States whenever a meeting was held. The voice of the Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, should be listened to as one single voice in the United Nations or even in NATO, although this would mean the need for a clear restructuring of both institutions. However, such a situation still appears to be a long way off.

Secondly, the advantages of one single command also provide considerable economic benefits, as well as making the European Union an efficient machine that is more stable, more secure and more effective. All in all, more Europe. That is to say, along similar lines to the single currency (Euro) managing to unite nearly all the countries and the way in which the free movement of persons and goods has been implemented, all under the same European legislation and regulations, it is necessary for the Europe of Defence to be for all and formed by all: «The Euro of Defence».

Throughout these years, there have been several cases of bilateral agreements in defence matters that have yielded positive results. For example, Spain has signed several bilateral agreements with France in Africa, in the operations in Senegal and Gabon, where Spain has offered air support. These are specific cases, but they make it clear that the security and defence of Europe must involve uniqueness, not just between two, but between all 27, even though this is more complex.

Putting the PESCO into operation is going to be easier now than at any other time: public opinion is supportive of defence. The 2017 Eurobarometer[28], has established that security is important to 75% of Europeans, it is one of their causes for concern. Now is the time to try and achieve this new Europe that wants to effectively and efficiently provide its citizens with the security they are demanding. The threats that Europe is facing, as defined in the European Union Global Strategy are of different kinds. However, the fact that two giants are among them, such as Russia and the great instability of the Sahel, inevitably requires cooperation, union, coordination and swift action. The Governments of the EU must examine how to develop and make the most of the enormous military capacities that they possess.

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28   http://www.Europerl.Europe.eu/external/html/eurobarometer-052017/default_es.htm#security.

The scenarios of the White Paper on future of Europe

The presentation of the White Paper on the future of European Union[29] by the President of the Commission, Mr. Juncker, a few days before the celebration on 25th March 2016 of the 60th Anniversary of the creation of the Common Market, amounts to a tacit recognition of the very serious situation facing this organisation prompted mainly by its major structural problems. The document reveals the need to reflect upon the future of Europe, at a time when the inability to deal with the problem of the refugees, the rise of populisms and, above all, the exit of the United Kingdom jeopardised the very existence of the Union itself.

In this sense, the White Paper is following the path of the European tradition stating that, in times of a major identity crisis, the European Commission must respond by presenting a detailed plan that must invariably lead to a step forward towards integration. This is what happened in 1970 with the Werner Report on Economic and Monetary Union, which proposed that EMU be implemented throughout the 1970s. Something similar occurred in 1989 and 1995 with the Delors Reports, which paved the way for the Single Market and the Eurozone.

However, the difference between these past circumstances and the present ones lies in the fact that the current situation is much more critical, amongst other reasons because a lot more is at stake. In this sense, the White Paper does not provide much peace of mind, given that it asks a lot of questions but offers few solutions and puts the Union in a very difficult position, by presenting a series of scenarios that include the possibility of an implosion taking place. The coldness with which the scenarios are presented, almost bordering on frivolity, could be interpreted from two viewpoints. On the one hand, from a positive perspective, which would stress the intention of the President of the Commission, Mr. Junckers, to bring about a debate in the heart of the European institutions in such a way that each State would be required «to define itself» with respect to the Union's future. On the other hand, from a much more critical perspective, which would accuse the President of the Commission of hiding behind a document that analyses with the same coldness, not only the possibility of rapidly progressing towards a federal Europe, but also the potential for doing an about-turn and dismantle the Union in stages, until it goes back to the model of just a common market.

In the above-mentioned sense, the White Paper puts forward five scenarios that can be summarised into two hardly viable options (a federal Europe and a complete

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29   «White Paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025» Available at   https://ec.Europe.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/libro_blanco_sobre_el_futuro_de_Europe_es.pdf.

renationalisation of the Union) and one possible alternative that can be regarded as the final solution. It would involve applying the reinforced cooperation mechanism contained in Title VII of the European Union Treaty, to enable a group of countries, a hard core, to progress towards integration at a faster rate than the rest. This is the option that is preferred by the four major countries that constitute the Union's driving force, because it allows a limited number of countries to go more deeply into integration, even if this means ceding sovereignty, without the rest being required to do so. This would also apply to Spain, which has chosen for this on two conditions: on the one hand that it is open to all the members of the EU and, on the other hand, that the entry criteria are perfectly defined, in a similar way to what happened with the Euro in its day.

Reinforced cooperation would thus appear to be the lesser of two evils or, if you wish, the only option and, in fact, and it has been there for several years. The Euro would be a perfect example, given that only 19 of the 28 Member States use the single currency. Something similar would happen with the Customs Union from the moment not all the countries form part of Schengen. Even with certain specific policies, countries like the United Kingdom, Denmark or Ireland have opted out of the decisions adopted by the majority of the members.

The main problem involved in opting for this path is that it could be considered a failure from a political viewpoint. Even though it might be regarded as a pragmatic way of «unblocking» stalemate situations, in fact it is tantamount to an admission of being unable to go forward as one single block. Division into several blocks is also very dangerous, because it could give rise to interminable fragmentations and confrontations between members. It would likewise amount to giving credit to the thesis that was defended by the previous British Prime Minister David Cameron before Brexit, that one should not invariably be looking for «a Union that is always better«, the EU's unofficial slogan for decades.

That is how it seems to be understood nowadays by the Members from Eastern and Central Europe, which are frequently accused of being the main impediments to the process of integration in such questions as the management of refugees, fearing that the strategy of concentric circles would really be designed to benefit the main Member States and that its ultimate aim would be to confine them to one end of the continent. According to this perspective, which involves applying reinforced cooperation in the current circumstances, this would accentuate the situation of marginalisation, while at the same time cutting back on the structural funds that have made such a contribution to improving their economic situation since 2004. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that at the end of February 2017, several of these countries grouped into what has come to be known as the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia), stressed the idea that «EU unity is of vital importance and must always be the starting point»[30] of any proposal for a solution.

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30   http://www.Europepress.es/internacional/noticia-polonia-eslovaquia-republica-checa-hungria-

To a certain extent, it could be said that the White Paper is a disappointing document because rather than being a roadmap, it is more of an à la carte menu that enables the reader to choose whatever option is in his best interest at any stage. With it, the Commission would appear to be taking for granted that there is no path to be followed when it comes to applying the integration process to 28 countries, in view of the enormous differences that there are between Northern Europe and Southern Europe, so it is better to opt for conservative solutions.

 Aware of the fact that Number 5 «doing a lot more together» is the ideal scenario and the one that a genuine union of States ought to be striving for, it seems that the European Union is currently content to develop the Permanent Structured Cooperation in Scenario 3 «Those who want to do more, they do more», which is where Spain has been from the very start as one of the most ambitious countries where this aspect is concerned. It is true to say that one has to decide how to interpret this scenario, i.e., what commitments, skills, efforts, etc., must be brought together and put into practice to reflect and achieve the Europe that will make a bold step forward in the defence area.

The European Union has to manage to involve the countries that *a priori* are not prepared to participate in the Cooperation in a more committed way, through taking measures that make them more aware of the importance of this instrument, and if necessary, with regulations that establish minimum levels of compliance for all the Member States..

Problems that the PESCO must face up to

Implementing the Permanent Structured Cooperation involves a series of added complications, inherent to the idiosyncrasies of the European Union itself.

On the one hand, the lack of trust in the European Union, as a consequence of experiences gained over these 60 years, where the citizens have not developed a feeling of belonging to Europe. So, it is difficult to defend what one does not want and does not know. The ineffectiveness in the Balkans, in Libya or in Georgia, inevitably leads to mistrusting the European Union as a vehicle for defence.

On the other hand, the very concept of a 2- or-3-Speed Europe is at loggerheads with European Union. Real unity requires the equality of all and for all. It is not possible that not all the countries use the Euro, that they have not all signed the Schengen Agreements or that they pay different VAT percentages. Although this

piden-mas-peso-ue-parlamentos-nacionales-20170302171114.html.

involves transferring sovereignty, deep reflexion is necessary and inevitable about whether or not we really want a Union of all the Europeans or just a giant bureaucracy unable to move under the weight of its own legislative chains.

Furthermore, we must not forget that «all of the members are not in, and neither do all of those that are in include everybody». Denmark has a referendum on the cards and does not take part in the CSDP, but neither does it hinder. Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Austria and Cyprus are neutral countries.

Then, in the CSDP all EU Coutries but Dennmark participate, while in the PESCO it´s all Countries but Malta.

The PESCO would basically be developed in the area of the defence industry. If this were the case, there would be a great deal of economic saving and it would probably be possible to make great progress towards the strategic autonomy. Mogherini herself makes it patent that the idea is to spend together to spend better: «investment in defence is still a matter that is controlled by each individual country. What the EU can provide is a platform to make the most out of investments and overcome fragmentation»[31].

Yet to speak about the defence industry is to use strong words for some of the major countries like Germany or France. In fact, although they are two of the driving forces behind Structured Defence Cooperation, it is equally true to say that they have their own bilateral agreements in the defence industry. Why? A real union means transparency as Mogherini said, but it would seem that the Franco-German axis is not willing to renounce the development of this industry on their own account.

It must be remembered that France is the only country in the European Union with a permanent seat, though, until March 2019, United Kingdom keeps on going EU member. Furthermore, it does not appear to be in favour of backing down over defence industry matters, where it is one of the driving forces in the European Union. Once again, national interests and the common interest overlap to the detriment of the latter, and giving way on these types of questions could mean losing votes in elections. The role of Germany must be added to all of this, because «public opinion is still doubtful about its armed forced being used as an active instrument» in that country»[32] which has already been shown in its White Paper on Defence that collaboration will complete, «with the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, in that order»[33].

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31   https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/portada/paises-de-la-ue-acercan-posturas-para-mayor-cooperacion-selectiva-en-defence/10010-3372193.

32   Ignacio Fuente Cobo «LA SEGURIDAD Y LA DEFENSA EN ALEMANIA: ¿PREPARADA PARA LIDERAR?» (SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN GERMANY: PREPARED TO LEAD?) IEEE Analytical Document. http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2015/DIEEEA56-2015_Revision_Defence_Alemana_IFC.pdf.

33   Javier de Carlos Izquierdo. «The White Paper on Defence in Germany and the role of Merkel in post-Brexit Europe http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2017/DIEEEO09-2017_

The PESCO must basically develop in the defence industry and this will be no easy task, owing to the economic interests of each nation. Germany is one of the great exporters of top-quality precision engineering principally to Russia and China. Is Germany prepared to forego these sales in favour of creating a «single sales point» where not only is this engineering created in Germany but also in other zones?

Solidarity Clause

With the Paris-London axis severed as a result of Brexit and knowing what is going on with respect to its position regarding the United Nations Security Council, France has decided to keep alive the Lancaster House bilateral Agreement signed with Great Britain in 2010. The Agreement involves sharing military, naval and nuclear capacities, on seeing that only they can lead the Europe of Defence, in the light of the rest of the Europeans' refusal to provide soldiers and pay for defence; this is unprecedented. The fact that the UK decides to leave the Union, yet the UK and France decide to keep this Agreement in force, shows that France does not trust either the PESCO or Germany. What is more, France knows only too well «where Europe lies», when after the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015, it invoked Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, the mutual defence provision, whereby if one State is attacked, the others must help it. France could have invoked Article 5 of NATO, which is similar, but decided to call on the EU. That position undoubtedly helps to make the Europe of Defence credible, but the response that France received from the European countries, each one looking for its own excuse for not participating actively, brought to light the fact that it is necessary to carry on joining forces in a task that is not going to be at all easy. On that occasion the different nations offered France help in the form of exchanging information, and seized the opportunity to mention the need to share information as a basic measure for the future. None of the States were prepared to put boots on the ground, which goes to show that there are too many rivers to cross in this area and that the idea of a European Army is rather utopian at present, because there is no commitment, there are no resources and neither are the legal regulations in favour. It must not be forgotten that if just one country were to say no to such an Army that would be enough to stop it from going ahead: Ireland has already said «NO» to a European Army.

France could see how no other country in the European Union wanted to take a step forward in the defence of something that affects everyone. Only the United Kingdom offered its help and Germany took over from France in Mali, once again showing who calls the tune in the field of defence geostrategy in Europe.

Libro_BlancoGermany_De_Carlos.pdf.

To rectify this balance, the European Parliament has asked the High Representative to intervene in the matter defining exactly what the procedures are for action when applying this clause, «so that the Member States can respond efficiently when it is invoked»[34].

The geopolitical game will be interesting insofar as it will be necessary to see if the two major European powers are really in favour of a European defence and a PESCO, or if as it seems, they want to be the protagonists in this change to take economic advantage mainly where industry is concerned.

In a climate of distrust between nations, getting those countries that wish to do more in a particular area, is a very ambitious challenge for Mogherini. Success comes with genuine unity and coordination, and that cannot occur in a Union that is heading towards a Federal State but is not prepared to cede part of its sovereignty (in this case, defence) to enable essential work to be done: Who will cede sovereignty in defence? Nobody?

Steps towards Permanent Structured Cooperation

The European Union has a budget more than twice the budget of Russia, which we consider to be a threat. However, it is not a question of spending more, but spending better. The Head of Diplomacy herself stresses via the EUGS, the urgent need to rationalise and guarantee the efficiency of investments through economies of scale.

Firstly, Europe has to carry on with a greater in-depth investigation into what makes the continent unique in the world where its civil and military capacities are concerned: the comprehensive approach that involves all the States so that they, make available to the Union its potential for action. But it must go further. Projection beyond Europe began in 2003 with Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was autonomous in nature. The European Union used its own resources and capacities in this intervention, which in this case was the French Barracks from which the Operation was directed. Since then, after that it could be discerned that the European community alone could only hope to manage crises because it did not have many more resources.

Yet the European Union also possesses the hitherto unused Battle Groups, one of the instruments developed after the Treaty of Lisbon. We could define them as tactical groups, battalions comprising about 1,500 men from the Member States (alternating) that can be deployed in 10 days on EU missions. It is an initiative that has been taken annually by all the EU States, it being established which countries have to provide

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34   http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_trabajo/2016/DIEEET08-2016_Arquitectura_Security.pdf Miguel Angel Benedicto, *The architecture of international security, a project in meltdown?* Page 63.

the battalions and when, the armies of all EU States being involved in these groups. Paradoxically, the Battle Groups have never been utilised by the EU, not even on the missions they have participated in. This tends to suggest that they seem to have been created in order not to be used, in view of the fact that since they were established in 2007 they have not seen any action despite the crises in which they were needed, such as Chad in 2008, (conflict between the Government Army and the rebels of the Popular Front).

Several reasons have been put forward to explain their lack of use. One such explanation is their deficient training casts aspersions on their operational efficiency, and another puts their inactivity down to the fact that as yet, there is no EU Permanent General Headquarters from which to coordinate their activities. Political, economic and coordination difficulties could all be added as further explanations. They are branded as inoperative and ineffective, problems that could be overcome if they were properly developed and utilised.

A lack of support in combat is another disadvantage, because they are groups devised for medium-intensity conflicts.

Another major problem that affects them is the absence of financing mechanisms: «He who provides, pays»; and this means that every State has to contribute with its own human and economic resources, in such a way that when faced with this dilemma, the States do not participate. Europe, ought to thoroughly examine the Athena mechanism (Denmark does not pay) so that these expenses are taken on by the European Union.

By way of summary, and to quote Admiral Treviño, «The fact that 20 nations with a total of 500 million citizens have made available intervention forces known as Battlegroups, numbering only two and with ground troops amounting to a mere 1,500 persons, i.e. equivalent to one battalion, indicates the clear intention not to use any EU unit in a crisis that requires a rapid intervention force available within 5 to 10 days».

Apart from the Battlegroups, the EUGS also mentions the role of the Eurocorps, a structure that is improving all the time and which could be put to much better use. The States themselves make their deployment capacities available to the European Union, although the idea is that in the future this corps could be made more functional and operational.

The PESCO and NATO

Mogherini has stated in several declarations that the Security and Defence Policy will only be developed jointly with NATO, but she also indicates in the EUGS, that

it is desirable for all the Member States to be «better equipped, trained and organised so they can make a decisive contribution to such collective efforts»[35].

NATO and the EU are different bodies and thus do not have the same ambitions, geographical questions being a major difference. Although many EU countries are members of NATO, the fact of the matter is that not only is the USA its main leader, but it is also the nation that makes the greatest economic contribution. The European Union has to concern itself with the countries in its own environment and develop its autonomy supplementing NATO.

The fact that a large number of countries belong to both organisations (21 of the 27 EU members are also NATO members), it is necessary for them to be complementary to each other without overlapping, because it is true to say that many of those who clamour against the PESCO and against the idea of developing the CSDP, do so mainly because of such functional duplicity between NATO-EU, and against the impossibility of achieving the genuine strategic autonomy that the High Representative is so in favour of. They also point out the problem with Cyprus and Turkey, in view of the fact that these two countries constitute a stumbling block to the cooperation that is currently taking place between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance regarding Defence Capacity Building or hybrid war, amongst others. This state of affairs means that many nations are deciding to enter only into bilateral agreements so as not to be vetoed by those two countries. It is clear that this impediment must be overcome.

However, the words of Mogherini, and the voices in the meetings held by the Ministers of Defence in July 2017[36] involving the countries interested in the PESCO, i.e., Germany, France, Italy and Spain, made it clear that the Permanent Structured Cooperation will be carried out by NATO, seeking a strategic autonomy but aware of the fact that cooperation with NATO is essential at the present time.

Firstly, the Eastern European countries, the Visegrad Four and the Baltic States, place much greater trust in the defence that NATO can provide them against Russia, than in the soft power capacities of the European Union. Those countries have seen Russia's role in Crimea and the EU's has merely applied sanctions, i.e. soft power. With an opponent like Putin, the countries in the East do not want to rely solely on the European Union, they would rather be under the auspices of NATO. Hence there are soldiers deployed in Latvia, under NATO control. To dispense with them would cause a major division within the European Union that would merely serve to damage the European Union's role in the world and burden down the CSDP.

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35   https://Europe.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_es_version.pdf.

36   http://www.defence.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa/2017/07/DGC-170713-reunion-ministras-paris.html.

However, that is not all, because as Professor Ruiz[37] points out, it must be stressed that the relationship will always essentially be supplementary, because if they decide to participate in the PESCO and then withdraw «*this could amount to a serious hurdle to overcome*».

It has to be made clear that Europe does not aim to rival NATO, but to obtain abilities that will enable it to resolve crises both autonomously and in a supplementary capacity, i.e., that Europe can act alone without needing NATO when the former thinks this advisable, while at the same time being fully aware of the aforementioned attitude of the countries in the eastern zone.

NATO is a collective defense organization, though it has also Crisis Management and Cooperative Security mission, whereas the EU is a multinational organization, of a global nature, which represents a community of values that are fruit of the Christian Humanism of Robert Schuman and brought together in the way of understanding Europe. This means that nearly all the countries share the same interests and values and some of them project themselves beyond its frontiers through the actions that the European Union carries out. Therefore, the European Union and NATO, at the present time, are still complementary to each other.

What does strategic autonomy mean?

The CSDP's progress passes inexorably through the strategic autonomy of the European Union, and is a basic point in the EUGS itself. The best way to define such a broad concept necessarily involves seeing what that autonomy reflects, within the European Union itself. It is necessary to know if the idea is for Europe to defend itself, i.e. for it to act on its own behalf, or for it to have available tools that enable it to function autonomously.

When the EU talks about strategic autonomy, it means that the European Union must be able to combine the ability to decide with the ability to act, progressing in the decision-making processes to take on autonomy, i.e., Europe can defend its own interests, principles and values as circumstances require. Europe even has to be able to do this alone, if NATO does not help it.

«As Europeans, it is essential that we take on greater responsibility for our own security. A more credible European defence is also necessary for the good of a healthy transatlantic association with the USA»[38]. This is the big difference with this new

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37   Ruiz Campillo, Xira. (2009). La Permanent structured cooperation: proposals for Spain.

38   https://Europe.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_es_version.pdf.

Security Strategy. To start with It is something new, even though the root goes back to the meeting in Saint-Malo in 1998 when France and Great Britain decided «to provide the Union with the ability to act autonomously with credible military capacities», given that they were the only two States that could try and be major from a military perspective, and they set this in motion. The strange thing is that it did not go from strength to strength as other European policies did[39].

Such autonomy requires the strategic ability to develop a campaign abroad by deploying troops, it involves information, aerial resources, satellites, military cargo aircraft, etc. At present, Europe can still not do this. That is why the Americans helped in Libya, because American information and aircraft were essential to mitigate the situation in Libya. The reality is that we cannot carry this out, but the aim is to develop those capacities, supplementing NATO, because the stronger the European pillar is, the stronger NATO will be[40].

The consequences of BREXIT

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union is not good news, because, *a priori*, it creates a problem of credibility, capacity and leadership where EU security and defence are concerned[41]. Great Britain is one of the Union's strong countries, with a powerful army and nuclear capacity. It is also a member of the United Nations Security Council. Its military expenditure amounts to 2% of the GDP and is sixth in the world[42]. The UK and France together, account for more than 40% of the EU's public defence investments[43].

Its intelligence services (MI6), are rated as among the most important in the world and the collaboration that has taken place to date in matters mainly concerning terrorism, have proved vital for the rest of the European agencies. The «EU's agencies

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39   The competition policy that makes it possible to penalise multinationals, the common agricultural policy or the trade policy, are clear examples of the benefits of unity. Great Britain will have to do this now.

40   Jeans Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General. European Parliament 7/6/2017.

41   http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari51-2016-arteaga-defence-y-security-de-la-ue-tras-el-Brexit.

42   http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari51-2016-arteaga-defence-y-security-de-la-ue-tras-el-Brexit.

43   https://www.ceps.eu/search?keywords=IMPLICATIONS+BREXIT+COMMON+SECURI-TY+AND+DEFENCE+POLICY&type=All.

and mechanisms are now in jeopardy (which could lead to the KU losing access to the European detention order, to the European criminal record system, to the fingerprint and DNA database in the Schengen Information System and its departure from EUROPOL»[44].

However, just when Brexit seemed to open the floodgates for the disintegration of the European Union, the result has been quite the opposite: the Union has become stronger. It has also shown itself prepared to make the most of Brexit to progress with the CSDP, because it is now possible to carry out basic tasks that could not be done in the past because Great Britain was against them. We are talking about a General Headquarters in Brussels, Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), from which the three non-executive operations that the European Union is currently involved in are being directed, i.e., Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic. The idea is that in 2018, these headquarters will follow a new path, making it more operational, that is to say, not just for assessment and training. In this sense, Great Britain's role was always to obstruct this element that was so necessary, considering it to be a way of overshadowing NATO, and it must not be forgotten that the United Kingdom has always acted as the USA's «ambassador» in Europe. Nevertheless, the signing of the Saint-Malo Agreement, in favour of a European defence, had already amounted to a breach with the USA, which the then American President Clinton did not understand, and now, the United Kingdom has relit the fuse by consolidating Brexit, which has made it more complicated for the it to defend its interests, all the more so when the USA under Trump, does not see the European Union either as a favourite partner or a relative to be looked after, quite the contrary, Trump's interests are directed towards the Pacific zone. If Brexit proves to be costly for Europe, it is also costly for the British.

Paradoxically, in spite of its powerful army and its view of the world from a hard power perspective, while Ashton was the High Representative for Britain, she abolished the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) Plans Division, so it was no longer possible to plan any military operation. And funnily enough, the United Kingdom has taken part in difference military operations below its national potential, though it has a ship in SOPHIA operation. One such example is Operation Atalanta against piracy in the Indian Ocean initiated by Spain, in which no English warship has ever taken part, yet they direct the operation from their Northwood OHQ. It is an operation that has invariably been headed by British personnel, from the General, to the Chief of Staff and all the liaison officers involved in institutional relations, intelligence, etc. That is to say, Great Britain has a great deal of influence in the operation, but without providing naval resources.

44   http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_trabajo/2016/DIEEET08-2016_Arquitectura_Security.pdf Miguel Angel Benedicto, *The architecture of international security, a project in meltdown?*

The United Kingdom's exit should mean that these headquarters cease to be a part of the EU, and that its place could be occupied by the Operational Headquarters of France, Greece and Germany. However, this will be no easy task because these facilities in particular, are also headquarters of the NATO Maritime Command.

Framework agreements will have to be reached with Great Britain like the ones signed with Japan, Canada, Colombia or the USA, collaborating to keep the peace. Probably, and the most sensible thing, would be for the agreement with the United Kingdom to be closer, in view of the prior relationship and, above all, because it is such a major geopolitical actor in the world.

A document «*Foreign policy, defence and development. A future partnership paper*»[45] has been published along these lines. It highlights the idea of the British continuing to cooperate within the framework of a special relationship, basically to guarantee the security of such a threatened European Union, stressing the important position that they occupy in the world and, above all, their contribution to the European missions, their special relationship with NATO, as well as the agreements they have signed with France[46]. In exchange for this, it is likely that the European Union should give way on other economic questions, when the final departure from the Union is eventually negotiated, under pressure from the United Kingdom as an actor, in matters concerning security and defence. However, it is true that foreign policy and the security and defence of the Union, are subjects that are far too important to be used to exert pressure when it comes to negotiating the European Union separation clauses.

The EU and Great Britain must not break off relations in the field of sanctions, because their imposition is one of the most effective aspects of foreign policy and one in which the latter will definitely want to carry on having a close relationship with the former. The same applies to the defence industry, a basic driving force not only for defence but also for the economy and where the companies from the major States. The reason for this is that in a free-market Europe the law of supply and demand reigns supreme…

Will there be a balanced system between the States? What is most likely to happen is that the firms with the greatest capacities will take over the smaller ones, which will cause government conflicts in view of the importance of these industries on a national scale.

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45   https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-a-future-partnership-paper

46   Lancaster. Military agreement signed between France and Great Britain in 2010, concerning cooperation and collaboration in defence, taking into account the fact that both are nuclear nations.

Where conflicts of the future are concerned, i.e. hybrid wars, sophisticated and persistent cyberattacks, there is no doubt that the unit will be what makes us less vulnerable. Hence Great Britain's move to make it clear that it wants to carry on collaborating and cooperating with the European Union.

The EU's capacities

Now the EUGS has taken a major step forward by creating the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). It is an operational headquarters for sending non-executive missions from the EU, the so-called European Union Training Mission (EUTM) being one such example. At present, the European Union is participating in three missions of this type: Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic, where the comprehensive approach mentioned earlier is being applied, providing the combating troops with training, so that it is they who can defend themselves from their enemies. They are mainly missions where the troops are trained and given advice. The problem facing the European Union is that the effectiveness of these missions is fairly low. This happens because they are generally Failed States. The task of training is also very difficult. The European Union has a comprehensive approach task to help to stabilise the country concerned.

Putting the MPCC into operation is highly symbolic in view of what it represents regarding coordination, structuring and constituting a step forward for a Europe that could not get started in defence. It likewise shows a political opening-up by the European representatives and, in this case, the Commission, which is prevented by Treaty regulations from financing elements associated with defence or military matters. To quote the High Representative, «Setting up the MPCC is a major operational decision to strengthen European defence. It will help to make non-executive European missions more effective and to improve the training of the soldiers in the countries concerned, all with a view to guaranteeing peace and security. This is important not only for our partners, but also for the security of the European Union»[47].

This body has been one of the main challenges that the European Union defence policy has had to face. Yet it has never been possible to implement the body because Great Britain argued that this instrument, would encroach upon NATO's territory, and as relations between Great Britain and the USA were very good, the former has always remained inflexible and steadfastly against the creation of the MPCC. The European Union has now come through the bad patch it had with Brexit and the next step will be to call it by the name that it really deserves given its characteristics: European

47   Comunicado de prensa,8/6/2017. http://www.consilium.Europe.eu/es/press/press-releases/2017/06/08-military-mpcc-planning-conduct-capability/.

Union Defence Staff. This will not be only for non-executive missions as it is now, but also for executive missions. At present, as the MPCC is in its initial deployment, is still supported by the current European Union Military Staff (EUMS)[48], although the idea is that in the future it should be an independent body. At present, the two headquarters are directed by the same person, even though they have different functions.

Yet the CSDP has not stopped there. In the area of cooperation, it proposes genuine integration and collaboration with the industry in a voluntary capacity, to ensure that the current defence budget, which is by no means small, can really give the required return. That is why the European Defence Agency is playing an increasingly high-profile role. Its main function is to determine operating capacities and enhance the need to meet them, strengthening the industrial and technological base of defence[49]. It is an arduous task because every country has its own interests and wants to protect them.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is thus opting for a common defence industry, coordinated and directed by the Agency itself, which envisages not only the construction and sale of arms as such, but one in which there is unity regarding cybersecurity defence, biological attacks, hybrid attacks, etc. It has been demonstrated that managing the common budget with cooperation, makes an enormous contribution towards achieving greater efficiency in expenditure, so that we can internationalise military expenditure.

The role of the European Union consists of encouraging cooperation in defence matters because, in the words of Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the Agency, «no Member State by itself, is in a position to effectively protect its citizen»[50]. Therefore, the EDA is taking actions that direct its activity towards the area of collaboration in defence industry matters, for both the military and security sectors.

The EDA should be the body that regulates the European defence industry market, allocating the military equipment for each country, coordinating meetings between the Member States to prevent two States from purchasing the same material. We need Europe to function in defence, in the same way that the USA functions in this field, to cut costs, to speak with one single voice, to be more effective, more efficient and to

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48   In this Military Staff, the main functions are giving advice, supporting the command and supplying military experts within the sphere of the EU (Common Security Policy, High Representative, etc.).

49   http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/!ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGj-zOKNg318fEKcHX1NTZz9QgKNXI0NDSBAvyDbUREAbg0Kqw!!/?WCM_PORTLET=PC_Z7_3SLLLTCAM54CNTQ27F30000000000000_WCM&WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari33-2008.

50   http://www.homsec.es/jorge-domecq-eda-Europe-pueda-actor-global-reconocerse-necesita-dotarse-las-capacidades-basicas-ello/.

improve capacity and gain time. It is necessary to progress in the areas of integration, with the backing of the European Defence Agency working as its coordinator.

In this sense, the European Commission has shown its commitment by developing the European Defence Fund, through which it aims to finance R&D&I projects as from 2021[51]. It is the first time the Commission has undertaken such a task. We are talking about 5,500 million Euros per year, spent on projects, developing capacities and among the Member States, encouraging, promoting and combining the common defence industry, in such a way that Europe makes a «joint purchase», either wholesale or distributing the capacities to each State. Some of that money is already being used for joint military research in 2017. If the Athena mechanism has until now been unable to defray defence expenses and the European Union has not been particularly inclined to contribute to these expenses, it would seem that with these measures, the Union itself is standing up for the security and defence of the Europeans, taking on the task of cooperation with the Member States where defence expenditure is concerned. Perhaps this the right time for the European Investment Bank to take part in these matters by investing in the defence industry and offering low-interest credits to the small and medium-sized businesses that specialise in the defence industry. However, one of the drawbacks that the European Union is up against and that is mentioned in other sections, is the legislation currently in force. In the Bank's case, its articles of association do not allow it to invest in defence, a change in this state of affairs would be essential for progress to be made.

It is hardly surprising that one of the main driving forces to have come out of the European Comission, is the creation of the European Defence Fund, with two different financing structures. One of these would finance cooperation projects in the defence area, but it would be each State that would defray the expenses involved in these projects with support from the European Union. The other financing structure is a *window of capacities*[52] in which support would be given to joint development.

The European Defence Agency will have to make an effort to adapt the progress made to the regulations in force and thus be able to work with the industry.

A further step in cooperation that would clearly amount to a breakthrough is the new measure whereby the EU Council introduces the Defense Annual Coordinated Review (CARD)[53] in such a way that the States can plan their national budgets jointly. This step in the right direction requires highly-developed and specific regulations from

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51   European Commission http://Europe.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_es.htm.

52   http://www.homsec.es/jorge-domecq-eda-Europe-pueda-actor-global-reconocerse-necesita-dotarse-las-capacidades-basicas-ello/.

53   http://www.homsec.es/jorge-domecq-eda-Europe-pueda-actor-global-reconocerse-necesita-dotarse-las-capacidades-basicas-ello/.

the EDA, to make sure that instead of any States feeling they have lost out, they feel they have gained. All the more so when sovereignty has not been transferred in the defence area.[54]

The European Defence Agency undoubtedly has a major role to play and a difficult task, in view of the national interests of the different countries where this industry is concerned, principally among the «strongest»: Germany and France, now that the United Kingdom has left the Union.

In 2016, the European Parliament urged the Union to «intensify coherent and structured cooperation regarding defence research, industrial infrastructure and cyber defence through pooling resources and sharing their use, with a view to making more efficient use of the national defence budgets, in order to achieve the objective collective contribution of 2% for defence research expenditure and to put into operation a research and technology programme in defence matters financed by the EU».[55]

The EU and Africa

Africa is the main challenge for the Union in a period ranging from 30 to 50 years. We are talking about a continent with a population of 1,200 million, covering a surface area of 30 million square Km and where approximately 2,000 languages are spoken.

The very low birth rate in Europe will be covered will be covered by a spectacular increase in the birth rate in Africa, to the extent that it is calculated that there will be around 4,000 million Africans that, in growing numbers, will come to Europe trying to improve their living conditions.

European Union' Global Security Strategy is aware of this and has established the African frontier as a dangerous zone where there will be serious unrest among young people is they cannot find the work or subsidies in their own land to enable them to live there. Apart from that problem, there is the question of the Failed States, which are a breeding ground for piracy, Jihadism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, etc.

In Europe, the saying «The problem is Africa and so is the solution» is often repeated. Some figures endorse this theory: between 2000 and 2010, the continent's economy

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54   Sovereignty transfers have taken place in the security area: on the Spanish coasts and the southern frontier, surveillance is also carried out by European Union coastguards.

55   European Parliament Resolution, dated 13th April 2016, concerning the Union in a world environment in mutation: a world more connected, disputed and complex (2015/2272(INI)). http://www.Europerl.Europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0120+0+DOC+XML+V0// ES&language=ES.

grew by more than 4%; Kenya has more telephones per person than any other country in the world; Spain exports more to Africa than to Latin America; Nigeria produces more films than the USA; the textile industry is moving from Asia to Africa, etc.

All these characteristics make Africa a continent full of hope where the resources it possesses are concerned and it is a challenge for the world and for Europe, as a guarantee for security and development. That is why the Armed Forces are deployed for security purposes on different missions in Mali, the Central African Republic, Senegal, Djibouti, etc. The aim of these missions and all the ones in which the European Union participates, is to provide a minimum degree of development that guarantees them a minimum amount of security to survive, with stable institutions, by creating a middle class and guiding them towards a democratic government system. However, it is true to say that the EUGS has also made it clear that not everyone has to accept either our values or our political system however much we might think that it is the most suitable.

The Sahel stands out as a special zone of interest, a region of crisis[56], affecting security, development and governance, and an area from which people emigrate. The security crisis experienced in Mali, affects the entire zone that borders the country, to the extent that if there is no peace in Mali, there will be no peace in the Sahel. The aforementioned security crisis is complicated by a problem of governance, with institutions that are backward, a high level of corruption and poverty and extensive frontiers that cannot be controlled. In view of all this, it is very difficult to have a stable government that can provide development and, thus, security. It is a zone with a high birth rate, with a lack of water and food and an absence of basic primary care, all of which makes the zone a breeding ground for terrorism and radicalisation.

The Sahel is a zone of contradictions. It is 5,500 km long and 400 km wide. It is a land of transit from north to south and from east to west; it has been a land of slaves, gold, arms, etc., for centuries. It is a zone where the north is Tuareg Arab and the south is Black African, with one area that is sedentary where the land is given over to farming, whereas the other zone is nomadic (shepherds).

Drug traffickers, human traffickers, terrorists, illegal immigrants, etc., continue to cross its porous frontiers. All of this explains why it is regarded as one of the most dangerous zones in the world, because it has the largest number of conflicts: Libya, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Yemen, which are fed by the terrorism of Daesh and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, food insecurity problems, severe droughts, intercommunity and religious conflicts, amongst others.

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56   Angel Losada, The EU's special representative for the Sahel. Summer Course in El Escorial , June 2017.

In the Sahel we can indicate that there is a first circle of influence arising from the Libya crisis[57] with a major impact on the whole region; a second circle would be formed by the States that do not form part of the G5, such as Algeria, Senegal[58] and Morocco, the latter being as country that aspires to having greater influence and has just joined the African Union. A third circle would be the countries that are members of the African Union.

The European Union has opted for an aid and financing project known as G5 Sahel, a force that is made up of soldiers from the five armies that is going to be provided with a Sahelian Security School, a Defence College on the initiative of Mauritania and a control centre. The ultimate aim of this structure is to create a Joint Force to fight not only terrorism but also human and drug trafficking, which are a blight on the whole area. It is also necessary to re-establish the presence of the State, which is a serious issue, especially in Mali, given that a lack of governance enhances terrorism. The difference between these missions and those that the EU is involved in, is that the Joint Force will act in a similar way to how France is acting in its fight against terrorism in Sahel territory.

The G5 is the institutional framework that concentrates its efforts on the fight against radicalisation, taking into account that being a radical in the Sahel is different from being a radical in France, because in the former the result will be poverty, whereas being a radical in France will lead to extremism. That is why the European Union is working against this radicalisation, mainly with the young. It must not be forgotten that in the Sahel Islam is Animist, which the rich Gulf States refuse to tolerate, because they think that if they do not act soon, Animism, which they consider to be a watered down version of Islam, will prevail over the Wahhabi version that they wish to impose.

The EU could extend the so-called executive missions such as the training missions (EUTM) to lend their support to the G5, increasing the degree of requirement and making them more operational. Carrying out this task costs money. The EU has an office with a special representative in the External Action Service, and it is from this office that military missions that involve training and strengthening the institutions are financed, such as the EUTM in Mali or the EUCAP in Niger. The cost of the European security should not be a problem. The resources allocated to this zone are not yet sufficient, even though the EU, the principal donor, provides € 3,500 million, coming from the European Development Fund, plus 1,800 million from the Fiduciary Funds. The Peace Support Fund for Africa was also set up, in order to help the African Union and organice it in peace keeping. However, this caused one of the main problems

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57   Italy is most affected by the Libya crisis. On an economic level, 70% of Italy's gas comes from Libya.

58   It must be pointed out that there has never been a coup d'état in Senegal and, when compared to the rest of the G5 countries, it has much stronger institutions.

with the European Union, as the Commission does not finance the purchase of arms. Therefore, this money is used to pay wages and to pay for equipment (uniforms), but not arms.

When the G5 was set up, it was rejected a priori by the African Union, and its existence was frowned upon. Algeria and Nigeria also showed their disagreement. However, the G5 has evolved well and has been accepted by all. The EU has even managed to get the UNO itself to assimilate this group.

The EU recently decided that the Sahel and the Horn of Africa as the two areas that Europe ought to be paying attention to, in order to stop Jihadism in its tracks. So far, the EU has established more than 17 strategies for the Sahel, which shows how little coordination there is over this issue. Hence the results have not been as hoped for. The EUGS has taken an about turn and is now showing a much more pragmatic and practical attitude towards Africa, providing money, in such a way that it has gone on from philosophy and theory to reality. It is true to say that one of the major problems facing Africa is the high level of corruption. Corruption means it is often the case that the money sent by the EU does not reach its intended destination. This could be combatted by better organisation and opting for regional organisations to manage that money, i.e., financing microcredits, specific projects, giving the local bodies the money that is needed to carry them out.

My security is the security of my neighbours, and the security of my neighbours, is the security of theirs. This way of thinking necessarily requires greater and better involvement from the European Union to prevent Africa from boiling over, especially the Sahel, to the extent that the Southern Frontier has moved further South to the Sahel.

Libya is another cause for special concern. It is a country currently split into two opposing «semi-states» with two parliaments (Tripoli and Tobruk), two armies and more than 300 militias fighting for and over tribal or local interests. There is no effective government and there is a lack of political culture in a country where no political alternating takes place between parties subjected to tribal loyalties, and where the representative institutions of a national nature are extremely weak. Libya has become a Failed State involved in a low-intensity civil war that could last years, even decades, without any easy solutions in sight, in view of the nature of this war in which none of the sides involved has sufficient capacity to obtain a military victory. For the EU, this situation of instability and the low-intensity conflict, plus the proliferation of organised crime and Jihadist violence has turned Libya into a «black spot» for Mediterranean security.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation, could find that the Sahel and Libya are their first and principle fields of action, given that the security of Europe depends mainly on the stability of these regions. The four countries that seem to be aware about the initiatives in these zones, ought to promote greater commitment from

the EU, starting with the Sahel, because it is the more accessible zone for military intervention. The frontiers of Italy and Spain are the closest to the zone, so thus are more concerned about keeping the Sahel zone stable and secure. France has felt the effects of immigration and suffered from terrorism. And Germany has seen how its refugee policy has taken its toll from a social perspective. Nevertheless, this country has decided to instigate its «own Marshall Plan» for Africa «involving the rich countries in Africa's economic development as an indirect way to check the flow of immigrants, guarantee the defence of free trade and stabilise the economy in the Eurozone»[59]

Both the UNO and the EU have developed several non-executive missions of the soft power type in Africa, in addition to the bilateral agreements between different countries as is the case with France and Spain. Yet maybe it is time to go one step further and guarantee greater efficiency and effectiveness. The PESCO should be responsible for organising, coordinating and managing the problems lying ahead for Africa, and for doing so swiftly and urgently, as the EU is so slow in operating.

It is true that objections might be raised by some of the countries that have signed those agreements, because all of them have their own interests, but it is equally true to say that the European Union would gain in prestige, if it were the Union through the PESCO, that was directing, coordinating and reorganising the different missions that are carried out.

Governance in Africa is more necessary than ever, so the PESCO could run and govern the projects devoted to improving the security sector, educating the young, advising governments in matters concerning the Armed Forces, etc. Perhaps these PESCO countries could demand compliance with certain standards that help to create security with democracy in exchange for economic aid from the EU and it could be the PESCO countries that are involved in these situations and direct them.

Whatever the case may be, as the Sahel is a problem that affects the whole of Europe, and not just the Southern European countries, the rest of the EU Members ought to collaborate economically, as well as providing personnel, equipment, etc.

Conclusions: What can the EU do?

After conducting the analysis, the conclusions to be reached are that the EU is one single organisation, with powerful qualities that can solve many problems, yet its excessive bureaucracy slows it down, rendering its efforts inefficient.

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59   http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/06/12/593ed0dce5fdea2f0a8b4574.html.

The PESCO, should speed up the non-executive missions it has been carrying out, making it more effective and efficient, especially in the Sahel. It may be necessary to create an «MPCC» in the Sahel, from which to coordinate the mission being undertaken exclusively in that zone coordinated by the countries that want to participate in the PESCO and in collaboration with the States affected, with a view to speeding up the programmes to be implemented. This would generate economic resources for country, strengthen ties between the European Union and African States and might create a climate of trust in those nations.

It is imperative that national interests be identified with European interests. As has already been pointed out, the European Defence Agency will play a basic role when it comes to reorganising and restructuring the defence industry, in order to prevent overlapping and to reduce the number of incompatibilities that the situation is currently affected by.

The European Union has to carry out the task of organising and coordinating for the future, so it can support the various organisations that are working to achieve security and development in the Sahel: the African Union, UNO, etc. Excessive overlapping occurs too often where the activities of these organisations are concerned. A series of countries structured through the PESCO, would find it easier to coordinate and optimise resources.

It is the Union that must be the leader when it comes to the bilateral agreements signed by European countries, so that they can be coordinated and supervised by the Union itself. Such leadership would pave the way for greater effectiveness and efficiency, as long as the EU ceases to be bogged down with red tape to the extent that it is unable to make decisions through a lack of consensus.

The European Union must be ambitious enough to aim to be a genuine global actor. This means it has to gradually strengthen its crisis management structures, equipping them with suitable capacities, and it must also strengthen its defence industry in a rational and collaborative way.

The first step in this direction would be to finally launch the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) envisaged in Articles 42 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, establishing which countries are not only prepared to participate in developing capacities and to deploy European military missions, but also have the ability to do so. These countries could then be used to create a fully comprehensive and autonomous European projection and protection force able to intervene at short notice, either within Union territory or beyond European boundaries. First of all the current Battlegroups could be used in battalions in real operations, both non-executive (such as training) and executive.

Although the EU is mainly soft power, it should not be afraid of carrying out executive missions if necessary. Such actions would send a clear message about the EU's will to make itself heard as an international actor. The Sahel is important to the

EU and must be prepared to attach greater importance to the zone. With NATO focusing on the countries in Eastern Europe, the time has come to make a decision about the Battlegroups, hitherto unused operational structures, because training them costs the EU money that is not being recouped. However, it is necessary to improve their modularity and the structural integration of their various national components has to be rearranged if they are to achieve acceptable levels of operational effectiveness.

Furthermore, if these forces proved to be insufficient, it would be necessary to strengthen them with a greater number of soldiers from the Member States, invariably coordinated by the MPCC. First of all, it would be essential to ensure that the political decisions about the use of the Battlegroups were taken by the European institutions, restricting the members' right to veto.

To finance all the operations that are strictly European, a European defence budget would have to be created, and it would have to be more far-reaching than the current Athena Mechanism. The commitments taken on by the States to increase their defence budgets up to 2% of the GDP could be utilised to fund this budget independently from the national budgets.

A third step, arising from the previous one, would be the need to coordinate through periodical reviews, the different national defence planning processes, integrating them into the European planning process developed by its Military Staff, along similar lines to the way NATO has done for decades. This would make it possible to obtain not only a general and realistic view of the Union's defence requirements, but also insight into the defence expenditure and the national investments in purchases, research and development in this field. Along these lines, it would be necessary to set up joint headquarters on a permanent basis, independent of those offered by the nations, which were responsible for planning, coordination and directing all the EU operations.

Fourthly, and stemming from the third step, the EU ought to finance those critical capacities whose price or particular complexity that cannot be acquired or developed by the Member States by themselves, and the Union should also support the Member States in obtaining the capacities that they need to deal with present and future threats, risks and strategic challenges. This means that it is necessary to devise new financing instruments that make it possible to develop new capacities and to cooperate in defence matters, supporting the European defence industry and technological innovation, as well as promoting cooperation that is strengthened in defence matters. The Commission's proposal to establish a common fund provided with €1,500 million per year for new equipment and military research is a step in the right direction, albeit insufficient if we compare it with what other global powers have allocated.

Finally, it would be necessary to unify the procedures and doctrines of the Armed Forces in the different countries in a way that would guarantee their interoperability at all times. European military academies could be established to guarantee that

all military personnel had exactly the same training regardless of their country of origin. A first step in that direction would be to generalise the military «Erasmus» and increase the number of combined exercises with military personnel from the different countries.

All in all, it is a question of getting the European Union to function jointly in the area of security, even though it is the most complex organisation in the world. This requires well-oiled machinery and an unequivocal and common political commitment. All the EU Member States have to be aware of the fact that the line separating prosperity from chaos is very thin. It is not a question of predicting black swan events, but of making it clear that a bad decision made by a country or a group of countries could, in a question of months, destroy any progress made in the process of integration in matters involving security and defence, and there is a lot at stake for Europe in this respect.

As the White Paper on the future of the European Union quite rightly points out, «for generations, Europe has always been the future». It is by no means certain that this will continue to be the case, and the doubt that we have to consider, and that will have to be dispelled separately in the near future by each and every one of the Member States, is whether that future, which has so far been promising, involves carrying on with the Union's integration process, or whether it means dismantling it.

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The Development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy: possible risks and pathways

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Introduction

The global security context has impressively grown in complexity over the past 10 years. Currently, in fact, Countries have to deal with threats that are increasingly becoming non-conventional, hybrid and, therefore, more challenging. The various crises that exploded in different areas of the world (such as Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans) are so deeply rooted and structured in such a complex manner that they cannot simply be contained, they necessitate a long-term solution. Considering that nowadays societies are highly connected and the phenomenon of globalisation is spreading all over the globe making borders increasingly blurred, the internal security of one Country can be influenced by the events happening somewhere else in the world. To be more specific, economic and social ties between different populations are so tight that the internal stability of most Countries depends on the domestic situation of others. This is particularly true for neighbour States – which share a geographical proximity – and economic strategic partners. Over the years the awareness of such a concept of interconnectivity and reciprocity has grown together with the realization that different Countries have diverse economic, political and security interests that need to be individually taken care of. For instance, problems of criminality and political instability in Mexico are of deeply concern for the United States, although they do not represent an immediate threat for most European Countries. On the other side, the migration crisis that has been afflicting predominantly Southern European States since 2013 does not appear

on the Pentagon's security agenda. Countries have therefore started to mind and take care of their own interests in a more independent manner.

As a consequence, the past years turn of events and the rise of new challenges have highlighted a divergence between Washington and Brussels' security concerns and priorities on their respective agendas. What clearly emerges, however, is the difference in response and normative framework building between the two parties. While the United States has elaborated a foreign and defence policy that mirrors its interests, the European Union (EU), despite having formulated a number of documents addressing foreign and defence policy, has not been able to implement them yet. This represents a quite alarming lack considering the security theatre in which the Union is located and where it plays its political and economic role. Since its foundation, in fact, Member States have preferred to focus on economic and social integration mainly for political reasons and motives of trust and coexistence. As a result, foreign, security and defence policies have remained under the sovereignty of individual States, which domestically regulate and formulate them. Despite the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 gave a new impetus for developing a common foreign and security policy by inserting it among the three pillars of the EU, its effective advancement has mostly turned into mere declarations. Even if these documents are the expression of a growing interest on the topic, they lack juridical efficacy and compulsoriness. The last declaration of this kind dates back to May 2017, when in Rome the EU heads of State and Government met for celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Rome treaties and discussed the future of the Union.

One could argue that the guaranteeing presence of the North Atlantic Alliance has counterbalanced the lack of a real EU foreign and defence policy and, therefore, ensured security in Europe. Nonetheless, as previously noted, in the last ten years the American approach to global crises has changed. While increasingly focusing on areas that are strictly related to its domestic interests, Washington has started moving its attention away from Europe. Hence, the latter has found itself alone in facing overgrowing menaces coming from different fronts.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the development of a truly common European foreign and defence policy has nowadays become fundamental for the existence of the Union itself. Such a statement finds its ground on the founding principles of the European Union, which provide for Member States to be united in a single physical and economic space, intended to be safe and open for all its citizens. However, considering that the security of a certain area is directly proportional to the quantity of risks and threats it has to face, reducing the number of menaces is vital for increasing the security of the territory. It is also necessary to consider that the global theatre is the stage for a multiplicity of threats and actors; as a consequence every State has different concerns and priorities depending on its security and economic needs. While ensuring that Member States maintain a certain degree of autonomy in the fields of security and defence, the EU has to play an active role in shaping effective common policies. Therefore, it is recommended that the Union develops a

credible foreign and defence policy which enables the EU to have a strong voice in the international community with the end of laying down communitarian interests and independently carrying them on. In sum, Europe needs a defence system able to adequately sustain its policies in the international security context.

The first chapter of this paper will briefly outline the main historical moments that have led to the creation of nowadays global environment. The dynamics that started with the eruption of World War I and developed with the end of the Cold War, in fact, have contributed shaping the current international security context. Secondly, the security scenarios of direct interest and concern for Europe will be described and an analysis of the related menaces (such as the threat of Russia, jihadist terrorism, and the migration crisis), their origin and impact will be provided. Moreover, the response that the Union should jointly give for guaranteeing security and prosperity to its citizens will be suggested. The following chapter will explore the risks related to leaving behind the project of a common foreign and defence policy. These risks originate from the threats challenging the security of the EU and translate into the possibility for the Union to permanently playing the role of secondary actor on the international scene. The fourth section delineates the possible pathways to the development of an effective and credible common security and defence policy. It focuses on the existent collaboration between the EU and NATO and suggests the development of an EU military assistance capacity and the integration of the defence sector at the Union's level. Lastly, a concise timeline of the developments made in terms of common security and defence policy will be given starting from 1948 until nowadays. The conclusion will set out recommendations for achieving a credible and efficacious common security and defence policy.

The International Security Context

The current international security context is extremely complex and characterised by the intertwining presence of a number of contrasting interests and antagonist actors. In order to define its traits, it is necessary to retrace the lines that throughout the years have drawn nowadays world order. There are three specific historical moments that have been remarkable in such a process: the second wave of decolonization, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

After World War I, the political equilibrium outside Europe was based on the existence of a few leaders able to make free, autonomous and unilateral choices on the developments of international relations. In fact, if one considers that the entire African continent, South and South-East Asia were under the control of a number of Western Countries (namely, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal) it is evident that at that time talking about foreign policy almost meant outlining some «good neighbourhood rules». Indeed, the colonial

empires of the above mentioned Countries had absorbed the vast majority of available land. As a consequence, the number of those sitting at the international decisional table was impressively low. Those dynamics started to lose ground following the end of the Second World War and the first declarations of independence. After the War, in fact, European Countries did not have enough resources to maintain their colonial structures nor to deal with the local movements claiming for independency.

Hence, since 1945 onwards, a series of new realities[1] started emerging and areas like North Africa, the Middle East and Asia became increasingly populated. Since 1945 to 1991, in fact, 130 new independent States entered the international arena and tried to express and achieve their own needs and goals. Each of these Countries had the need to affirm itself in its regional sphere and to get rid of the economic ties with its former motherland, which had, until then, formed the basis of its economy. The new States, therefore, began actively operating inside their regions driven by the necessity of creating an independent economic substrate and a net through which carrying on their national interests.

During this period of time, as a consequence of the creation of new regional equilibriums, a number of the tensions emerged, which quickly translated into regional crises. These last ones, however, were absorbed and handled (at least until 1989) by the two main actors of the ideological clash that was occurring, the Cold War. The new generation's States could count on the economic and military support of either the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for dealing with regional instability and creating their own State structure, giving in exchange their political loyalty. Western European Countries were also involved in the Cold War's dynamics, in which they chose to be on the US side. It is worth noticing that the USSR's geographic proximity[2] was a matter of anxiousness for some European States as an escalation of the conflict could have led to the destruction of their territories. Hence, the protection and support granted by the US was vital for European security. The European defence structure was therefore based on the guaranteeing presence of the United States and on the status of member (of most European States) of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO was born following the signature of the Washington Treaty in April 1949, which provided for collective defence of all its Member States. Being part of the Alliance granted European Countries not only to focus on their economic growth and on the development of the European Economic Community (EEC) starting from 1957, but also to avoid taking directly responsibility for their defence.

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1   See, for instance, Countries like Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco for the North Africa; Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria for the Middle East; the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, India, Pakistan and Myanmar for Asia.

2   Intended as the proximity between the USSR and the Countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The only attempt to give rise to a wholly European defence took place in 1950 following the proposal of the French Government to create a European army, the so-called European Defence Community (EDC). Under the Pleven plan[1], France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux started the negotiations for the EDC. The experiment, however, did not last long. A number of factors weakened the deal: the general lack of trust, the fact that the United Kingdom was not part of the agreement and that West Germany was about to fully enter NATO. In 1954 the plan for the EDC was completely abandoned following the refusal of the French National Assembly to ratify the agreement, considered too risky and superfluous.

Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, the defence and security scenario in Europe started to take a totally different shape. Given the gradual reduction in reciprocal menace and the domestic situation both in the USSR and the US, the two superpowers entered a phase of strategic reflection and re-settlement. In the case of the USSR, its economy was experiencing a particularity tough moment[2]. Moreover, during the '80s secessionist movements began intensifying in the Soviet block and, given its economic and political situation, the USSR gradually lost the control over all its satellites States, including East Germany. In the US case, Washington had to deal with a public opinion tired of the numerous economic sacrifices made for realities that were far away from America's everyday life.

The stepping back of the two superpowers left a political vacuum in areas they used to oversee, giving the possibility to new players to enter the global arena. The importance of these dynamics lays in the fact that the willingness of the new and young emerged realities to have their own economic, commercial, ethnic and religious standards, led to the outbreak of crises in many areas of the world. It is possible to delineate six areas of tension that arose (the Middle East, North and East Africa, Ukraine, the Pacific and the South-East Asia), four of which currently have a direct and severe impact on the internal stability and security of EU Countries. Despite being exposed to the consequences of these crises, the European Union has always tried to absorb the blow in the least dangerous manner, without actively trying to solve the root problems. The EU leaders need to consider that the vacuum left by this political inactivity provokes a worsening of the crises and a consequent increase in the number and danger of the menaces on the European territory. Therefore, the Union should take up responsibility for its own defence, on an equal base with the other global powers, in order to guarantee security to its citizens.

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1   For more information, see: http://www.fransamaltingvongeusau.com/documents/dl2/h6/2.6.1.pdf.

2   Both the USSR and the US entered the Cold War right after the end of the Second World War, hence they had no time for adjusting their economies. Moreover, the ideological conflict unrolled into an arms race between the two superpowers. Overall, the economic engagement during the conflict was impressive.

On the basis of these recommendations, the following chapter will give an overview of the dynamics that are of European interest and towards which a more active behaviour would shape a more stable and secure scenario for the EU.

The Security Interests and Priorities of the European Union

As previously briefly mentioned, there are four security scenarios that are of direct interest and concern for Europe: North and East Africa, the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis and the relations with Russia. Given the geographical location of these scenarios and their proximity to some European States, the Union is now divided between Countries prioritising the Eastern front and those focusing on the threats coming from the Southern flank[3]. Such a division, however, does not consider the fact that, given the level of integration achieved in the Union, the consequences of a crisis exploded at whichever EU border would spread to all States. This statement will further be explained later in this section.

The Eastern front is of immediate interest for all those Countries, which used to be part of the Soviet block[4] and are now members of the EU, and that consider the posture of their neighbour Russia as increasingly aggressive and threatening their national security. The anxiety of these States, which has worsened after the Ukraine crisis of 2014, generates from the possibility of Russia interfering in their domestic policies. Since their entrance in NATO, the security and defence of Eastern European Countries has been granted by the Alliance and the constant support of the USA. Despite Obama's policy of «Rebalance to Asia» and the following change of administration led to a variation in priorities on the US defence agenda, Eastern States continue to be reluctant to double their efforts through a stronger participation in an European defence, and to remain devoted to NATO.

The Southern flank includes all Countries located on the area of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) facing the Mediterranean Sea. These last ones are evidently of direct importance for those European States on the opposite shore as well as for their neighbours. In the last years a series of security concerns, which were born in the MENA, have increased in burden menacing the stability of the EU. The massive migratory flows towards Europe, the phenomenon of jihadist terrorism (which emerged with the Syrian and Iraqi crises), and economic and investment issues are the most remarkable and alarming examples.

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3   The wording 'Eastern and Southern flank' was firstly coined by NATO and keeps on being used by the Alliance. Nonetheless, it applies to the dynamics internal to the European Union in the context of defence and security. This is the reason why it will be used in this paper.

4   Mostly Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania.

Since January to June 2017 more than 72 thousands migrants and refugees arrived in Europe[5]. While 71.418 made the journey by sea, only 999 of them reached the EU territory by land. This data represents a trend that is dangerously growing since 2014. The migratory phenomenon is caused and influenced not only by the war status of the Countries of origin, but also by a number of economic, environmental, political and social factors that, when combined, generate a general and widespread malaise that induce part of the population to undertake such a risky journey, searching for a better future. Hence, the migration crisis is structured in a very complex manner and has deeply rooted causes which need to be handled and solved using a variety of tools. Besides providing hospitality, in fact, the EU necessitates to work on different plans of action able to manage the problem at the source that are the Countries of origin.

Another source of instability for the internal security of EU States is the expansion of the phenomenon of jihadist terrorism. Following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, European Countries had to start dealing with second-generation terrorists and foreign fighters attacking their cities, causing victims, terror and a general sense of insecurity. In order to properly analyse the phenomenon, it is necessary to focus both on the origin of the Islamic State and on the strong influence it has on those people that, despite being born and living in an EU State (the so-called second-generations), are prone to embrace the ideology of ISIS. The emergence of the Islamic State has its roots in the worsening of an internal conflict, which in turn, was generated by the detrimental mixture of different dynamics. ISIS finds its ground in a weak government, an inexistent social state, and ethnic, religious, territorial and political differences. In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State used these weaknesses to spread a strong ideology and a primitive welfare system, which ended up substituting the State apparatus. The Islamic State has also managed to expand its reach to those people of Middle Eastern origins, but who effectively are European citizens. As such they enjoy freedom of movement inside the Union. Evidently, the menace posed by these radicalised individuals is not only internal to the State they live in, but it is also transversal to all EU Countries. Therefore, the European Union needs to jointly take action for dealing with the spread of terrorist groups inside and beyond its borders.

Finally, economic, trade and investment issues are a matter of concern for all European Countries. At this regard, the Italian case is exemplary: 90% of the natural gas Italy consumes comes from Countries located in North and Central Africa, the Middle East and Russia. Furthermore, Italy heavily depends on the oil import from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Central Africa. The same data with few variations on the origins can apply to all EU States[6]: more than 50% of EU consumption comes

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5   «Migration Flows in Europe,» IOM, available at: http://migration.iom.int/europe/.

6   «Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-28, 2004-2014,» Eurostat, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-28,_2004%E2%80%9314_(%25_of_extra_EU-28_imports)_YB16.png

from imports[7]. Hence, the stability of Countries situated on the MENA area is crucial for guaranteeing the constant refuelling of EU States, the continuity of productive activities and everyday life of companies and citizens.

The welfare of most European Countries also depends on the investments EU companies make abroad, the so-called foreign direct investments (FDI). These last ones are activated if the hosting Country not only has convenient production costs and solid infrastructures, but also if an effective system of government that ensures the stability of the State and the warranty of law[8] is present. Overall, the existence of stable States is crucial for the livelihood of nowadays globalised world in which international trade and FDI play a critical role for national economies.

To conclude, it is evident that those trends menacing peace and stability in Europe have their roots in the tensions emerged in Eastern Europe and in the political instability afflicting the MENA area. Furthermore, these same threats have a destabilizing impact on Countries geographically close to them, and also to all States that have political and/or economic relations with the Country of origin of the menace. As a consequence, a joint EU response would be more efficient, also considering that the alternative would be a worrisome return to political, economic and social nationalisms that Europe abandoned in the last fifty years. The concept of a common EU response necessitates further discussion as it includes not only a military response (which is considered fundamental for the credibility of intentions and for giving an effective resolution to the first moments of the crisis), but also a medium-long term answer achievable through foreign policy and aimed at solving the root causes of the conflict, being them social, political and economic. If build upon this structure, the EU can shape a strategy that covers both a common defence and foreign policy. In order to achieve this goal, following the guidelines the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, has provided, the EU needs to firstly create a joint credible defence based on a centralised chain of command and control and on a system that assimilates the capacities of individual Member States. The second step will imply the integration of the EU defence industry, which would increase competitiveness on the international market thanks to the optimisation of resources in terms of projects, innovations and technologies. Solely by integrating the three components of politics, capacities and industry, the Union will be able to jointly respond with one voice to the international challenges, taking up the responsibilities that belong to a global power.

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7   «Energy production and imports,» Eurostat, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports.

8   Warranty of law intended as a solid normative system that guarantees continuity to judicial and fiscal conditions, such as private property in the first case and a fiscal rate that does not change over a certain range with time in the second case.

The Risks of Abandoning the Project

The previous chapter discussed the main areas of interest for the EU and the response that the Union should jointly give for guaranteeing security and prosperity to its citizens. The risks related to leaving behind the project of a common foreign and defence policy will now be explored. Firstly, continuing unilaterally managing the problems above analysed might lead to a return to those nationalisms that where present before the formation of the Union. Hence, the gradual fragmentation of the EU is a risk that cannot be underestimated. Secondly, if the Union does not seriously take up responsibility of shaping its foreign and defence policy, it runs the risk of permanently playing the role of secondary actor on the international scene. As a consequence, the EU might not be able to autonomously establish its security interests nor satisfy them.

As already explained, a number of phenomena are threatening the security of European Countries. In particular, the instability in the MENA area is source of many menaces: the migrant flux towards Europe, the increasingly growing terrorist threat, the possibility of an energetic crisis and a reduction in international trade.

Since about the past five years, Member States, following the principles of Humanitarian International Law[9], have been trying to deal – and are still currently struggling to – with an extremely elevated number of people leaving their Countries and asking for political asylum inside the Union. What clearly emerges is that Europe is not properly prepared to handle the burden of the crisis. In April 2015 the European Union launched EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, aimed at undertaking systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose vessels used or suspected of being used by migrant traffickers[10]. Despite the operation represents an important step forward in jointly handling the migration crisis, it can be considered as a short-term solution. It is possible to argue that, if the EU does not elaborate a long-term strategy aimed at solving the root causes of the phenomenon, the Union risks that single States decide to individually manage the situation by starting looking inward and strictly focusing on domestic stability. This implies the closure of borders as well as the dialogue with neighbour States. Overall, such a development would challenge the significance of the Union itself as a geographically and socially integrated entity. This type of dynamics already unrolled in 2016 when five Countries of the Schengen area

9   Geneva Convention 1951, Convention on the Status of Refugees (available at: https://www.unhcr.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Convenzione_Ginevra_1951.pdf) and the Protocol on the Status of Refugees 1967 (available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/protocolrefugees.pdf)..

10   «EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia,» EEAS, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med_en.

(namely Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Bulgaria and Norway) reinstalled checks on their borders[11], while other three (namely Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia) announced to have definitively closed their borders[12]. The progressive closure of frontiers is leaving Countries of first arrival like Greece (which is also experiencing a severe economic crisis and enjoying the financial aid of the Union) and Italy alone in dealing with the migratory flux. Moreover, the closure of one route simply leads to the usage of another[13]. It is evident that the initiatives of single States will not improve the situation; solving the migration crisis, in fact, implies intervening at its roots and bringing internal stability back to the Countries of origin. The ultimate goal is to ensure that aspiring migrants can improve their living situation while remaining in their own Country.

The phenomenon of jihadist terrorism is dangerously growing in number, intensity and complexity. According to the information released by Europol, terror attacks pursued under the flag of ISIS in the European Union incremented from four in 2014 to seventeen in 2015.[14] European Countries are increasingly hit by the phenomenon, which has already made hundreds of victims. The year 2017 is being particularly bloody counting a dozen of attacks; this data indicates an alarming growing trend. Even more worrisome is the fact that most of these attacks are not carried on by well organised and structured ISIS groups which operate under a clearly given mandate, instead they are the result of the willingness of a person or a number of people to support the cause of the Islamic State. Such a phenomenon is seriously challenging national governments and those in charge of internal security, as they have to deal with something that is impossible to handle alone at the State level. In 2016, 718 suspects connected to jihadist terrorism where arrested in Europe[15]. Also this data has impressively increased if one considers that the year 2013 counted 216 arrests, the following year the number rose to 395 and in 2015 more than 650 people were imprisoned[16]. In order to deal with the phenomenon of ISIS terrorism a European coordinated approach is needed because

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11   «Refugee crisis: Six countries in Schengen now have border checks in place,» The Independent, 4 January 2016, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-six-countries-in-schengen-now-have-border-checks-in-place-a6796296.html.

12   «Balkan countries shut borders as attention turns to new refugee routes,» The Guardian, 9 March 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/balkans-refugee-route-closed-say-european-leaders.

13   This statement is valid both for sea and land routes.

14   «EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report – TE-SAT 2016,» EUROPOL, available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016.

15   «EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report – TE-SAT 2017,» EUROPOL, available at: file:///C:/Users/valer/Downloads/tesat2017.pdf.

16   Anghelone F. and Ungari A, «Atlante Geopolitico del Mediterraneo,» 2017.

of two main reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned, the Schengen agreement[17] facilitates terrorists present inside the Union and with the citizenship of a Member State to freely circulate in the EU territory. Hence, trying to continue handling the terrorist threat solely at the national level could lead to the expansion and proliferation of the phenomenon. Instead, a communitarian approach would cover the entire EU territory and guarantee a more efficient management of the menace.

Secondly, the security strategies and the repressive methods so far used have revealed themselves not to be successful in countering terrorism. These strategies need to be substituted by preventive actions to be taken in the Countries of origin of the menace. It is there, in fact, where the phenomena that are dangerous for European stability and security generate and evolve taking new forms. For instance, jihadist terrorist was born after the political and institutional fragilities in Syria and Iraq, therefore, even if a definitive defeat of the Islamic State is achieved, the same fragilities will facilitate the emergence of new crises and worrisome phenomena simply under a different name.

For what concerns another area of interest for Europe, namely maintaining energy commercial channels safe and the international market open, the risks related to solely applying unilateral approaches are of great relevance. Considering the level of economic integration reached on a global scale, an autarchic involution would imply enormous monetary losses. This is especially true for raw materials as they are of crucial importance for most European productions. It is therefore evident that an EU passive attitude in the case of the explosion of a crisis in one of its supplier Country would heavily and immediately impact most European economies and, consequentially, the international market.

What emerges from the analysis of all scenarios that pose a direct threat to the security of the Union is the necessity to jointly act in a preventive manner in the area of origin of the crisis. In order to have a political impact on the international scene, the EU needs to systematise its capacities and render its actions credible. The same direction should be followed for the development of a common defence industry. As already briefly mentioned, the degree of credibility of a foreign and defence policy depends on the level of autonomy it can be carried on with. Considering that such level of autonomy mostly includes the industry capacity of the defence sector of a Country, there are mainly two risks related to the lack of integration of the defence sector at the EU level: (1) the loss of autonomy and, as a consequence, of credibility in the international security context; (2) the loss of competitiveness on the international markets. It is worth noticing that an industry that is not able to compete in terms of know-how and new technologies corresponds to non-competitive industry on the global markets. According to a study of the European Defence Agency (EDA),

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17   The signature of the Schengen treaty in 1985 led to the creation of Europe's Schengen area in which internal border checks have largely been abolished and free movement inside is allowed.

the costs related to the waste of resources (duplication of projects, inability of the single governments to finance long-term projects, etc.) oscillate among 25 and 100 billion per year.[18] Therefore, the risk related to not carrying on the integration of the defence sector of the industry translates into remaining secondary actors both on the international market and in the international security context.

Pathways to a Common Security and Defence Policy

While trying to delineate the possible pathways to the development of an effective and credible common security and defence policy, attention needs to be devoted to the existent relations among Member States, and current pace of collaboration between the EU and NATO. Mrs Federica Mogherini has recently restated the importance of the cooperation between the EU and NATO on several topics, among which security and defence appear on the top of the list. Given the reciprocal roles and responsibilities, such a cooperation unrolls as follows: the engagement of the Union in the field of security and defence will not replace the one of NATO (which remains of core importance for Europe); while on its side the Alliance will guarantee the development of military capacities able to ensure credibility and efficacy in future eventual international commitments.

The previous chapters have demonstrated that what all crisis scenarios of European interest have in common is the necessity to be handled by acting at the source and stabilizing the areas of origin. In order to fulfil this indisputable need, the EU will have to firstly construct its own military assistance capacity. The development of the latter will simultaneously meet four prerequisites of the Union: (1) it does not clash with NATO activities; (2) it can be carried on by small and highly specialised teams, hence making the EU military dimension gradually growing; (3) it operates with a long-term perspective;[19] (4) it is perfectly suitable for coordinating with the already active soft power tools the EU possesses. Considering the migratory flux, for example, if such approach could be applied to North Africa and the Balkans, it would stabilize these regions contributing to solve the migration crisis. For what concerns the spread of jihadist radicalisation inside the EU and the freedom of circulation within its borders, Member States need to jointly increase their counter-terrorism capacities at the Union's

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18   For more information, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet_en.pdf.

19   Generally, a military assistance project consists of a support plan that sees the Government or Governments of the project training the civilian and military forces of the Government in crisis in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the State structure through the development of an Internal Law Enforcement, which is autonomous and efficient. Usually, this type of project goes alongside those of Development.

level. For instance, the European Gendarmeries, now part of the project European Gendarmerie Forces[20], could play a crucial role at this regard. In fact, they could systematise and increase their expertise by shaping a common know-how on counter-terrorism. Regarding energy procurement and the possibility to invest abroad, in this case as well the capacity to stabilize areas of interest is of vital importance. However, the security of commercial channels needs a dedicated focus. Taking into account that 90% of international trade is carried by sea[21], the EU will also have to guarantee security to the transit points of goods, namely the Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) and the Choke Point, which are increasingly threatened by territorial disputes, piracy and sabotages[22]. With this end, a more cooperative approach at the EU level in the sphere of patrolling and controlling commercial channels is particularly urgent, also for avoiding the duplication of on-going projects and therefore a waste of human and financial resources.

Last but not least, a brief note on the defence industry, as based on a solidly structured European security and defence policy, is owed. At this regard, the EU made a great step forward with a project the European Defence Agency (EDA) took care of. The European Commission, in fact, charged the EDA with handling a fund (the European Defence Fund, active since May 2017) aimed at combining the defence industries and the military capacities of those Member States interested in an increased integration in the sector. The fund, therefore, is based on the voluntary adhesion of States and provides for two possibilities: one is related to research and development projects, it is fully funded by the Union and can be activated only through the presentation of joint projects among two or more States; the other possibility concerns the development of common defence capacities, it is co-funded by the Union and can be activated by presenting common projects as well. Given the extremely valid incentive of the EU, Member States should embrace the project and actively respond.

The Evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy

The idea of shaping a common defence in Europe dates back to 1948, when the United Kingdom, France, and the States of the Benelux signed the Brussels Treaty. The agreement, in fact, included a provision for reciprocal defence in case of external aggression laying the bases for the creation of the European Western Union (WEU), a defensive alliance. The latter was founded in September of the same year and adopted

20   For more information, see: http://www.eurogendfor.org/italiano.

21   European Union Maritime Security Strategy, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/sites/maritimeaffairs/files/leaflet-european-union-maritime-security-strategy_en.pdf.

22   *Ibid.*

a program for common defence that provided for the integration of aerial defence and the creation of an organization for joint command[23]. The experiment of the WEU, however, had a short life. With the birth of NATO in 1949 and the appointment of General Dwight Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in December 1950, the signatory States of the Brussels Treaty decided to merge their military organization with NATO, which became central to the security system of Western Europe and the North Atlantic region. As a consequence, the WEU, revised in 1954 and made of ten Member States, survived until the end of the '90s in parallel with NATO acting as a consulting forum for the dialogue on security and defence in Europe. In 2007 the WEU was definitely absorbed by the European Union[24].

Despite its short existence, the WEU had quite an impact in shaping a common European defence. In 1992 the Members of the European Western Union agreed the so-called «Petersberg Tasks» aimed at defining the contexts in which the military units could be deployed: humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace-making operations. Under the mandate of the Petersberg Tasks, the WEU carried on six missions until 2001[25].

Meanwhile, in 1997, the Member States of the European Union adopted the Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. Despite the Treaty did not provide for the creation of a common defence policy, it codified a series of new structures and roles for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As a consequence, the responsibility of European Countries in the field of peacekeeping and humanitarian support increased, through the establishment of stronger ties with the WEU, for instance.

The end of the Cold War and of the conflict in the Balkans marked a turning point in the European political thinking on a common defence policy. It became evident, in fact, that the European Union had to take up responsibility in preventing conflicts and managing crises. Hence, the Amsterdam Treaty established a new figure inside the Union: the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). The latter was charged with guiding the EU towards the development of a common foreign policy and, in the future, a common defence

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23   «History of WEU,» Western European Union, available at: http://www.weu.int/.

24   «Shaping a Common Security and Defense Policy,» European External Action Service, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5388/saping-common-security-and-defence-policy_en .

25   These six missions where: Operation Sharp Guard (1993/1996), a maritime operation jointly conducted with NATO in the Adriatic Sea; a Police and Customs Control Operation on the Danube in cooperation with Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (1993/1996); a Police contingent in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1994/1996); a Multinational Advisory Police Element in Albania (MAPE, 1997/2001); a Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM, 1999/2001); and a Security and Surveillance Mission in Kosovo (1998/1999).

policy, therefore giving a sole voice to EU interests. Moreover, the Treaty absorbed the Petersburg Tasks of the WEU inside article 17 defining the scope of military actions the EU could undertake, namely humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace-making operations[26].

The European Council held in Cologne in 1999 represented a further step forward as Member States reaffirmed their willingness to develop not only a common foreign policy, but also autonomous defence capacities which could count on the support of a credible military force and tools useful for deciding when and how to use it. Such an establishment, of course, would have not jeopardized the priority of an eventual NATO action.[27] In Cologne Member States agreed on the necessity to create new institutions for analysing, planning and conducting military operations. This would have implied:

- Regular meetings of the General Affairs Council (GAC) and, when appropriate, of the national Ministries of Defence;

- The establishment of a permanent body in Brussels, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), made up of national representatives (most likely at the ambassadors' level) with military and political competences;

- The formation of the EU Military Committee composed by military representatives and aimed at supporting the PSC through recommendations;

- The institution of EU Military Staff with a related situation centre;

- Other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies.

The Heads of State and Government of EU States also underlined the necessity to create truly European military forces with relative headquarters, specialised in crisis management operations. In addition, during the Cologne meeting, five fundamental principles for the establishment of the CSDP were outlined:

1. The possibility for all Member States, including the non-Allied ones, to fully and on the same level participate to EU operations;

2. The provision of agreements (based on the at that time existing consultation arrangement inside the WEU) for European States members of NATO, but not of the EU, that would grant them the greatest possible inclusion in operations led by the European Union;

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26   Ibid.

27   It is worth noticing, however, that already since the fall of the Berlin wall the Alliance entered a period of strategic reflection, the same that led the States of the European Union to start a dialogue on defence.

3. Arrangements aimed at ensuring that all participants to EU-guided operations have the same rights concerning the conduction of the operations. This, without jeopardising the principle of autonomy of the European decisional process, in particular the Council's right to discuss and decide on principles and politics;

4. Ensuring the development of mechanisms for reciprocal consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU;

5. Considering the modalities for granting WEU associated partners the possibility to be involved.

On the basis of the above-mentioned requirements, starting from the WEU Ministerial Council of Marseille in 2000, the functions and institutions of the Western European Union gradually started to be absorbed in the EU. In 2002, in fact, the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite Centre respectively became the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC).

Following the will expressed in Cologne, the European Council held in Helsinki in December of the same year produced the Headline Goals 2003, which set the objective to establish, on a voluntary basis, a rapid response force by 2003. The latter was meant to be autonomous from a military point of view (having one unit of command and control, its own intelligence capacity and logistics), possibly also engaged in the naval and aerial fields and able to sustain a one year deployment.

A further step forward was taken with the establishment of a 'credible military force'. While waiting for the EU to endow its own military force through national or multinational contributions of its Member States, the 2003 Berlin Plus Agreement granted to the EU, under certain conditions, the access to NATO assets and capacities for crisis management operations led by the European Union. Probably aimed at substituting for a lack of initiative of European Member States, the Berlin Plus Agreement introduced a package of accords intended not only to provide the EU with tools useful for pursuing the Amsterdam Treaty and the Cologne Council, but also and especially to create a framework for permanent relations between the EU and NATO.

Such a framework was designed to guarantee European sceptics that the respective roles of the two organizations would have not overlapped; instead an eventual EU intervention would have been subordinated to a NATO decision of not intervention on the scenario of interest. Formally, and taking into account that the details of the agreements are secret, the Berlin Plus provided for:

1. A deal that regulated the exchange of classified information between the two organizations under norms of reciprocal protection;

2. The access to NATO planning capacities for civilian-military EU-guided operations;

3. The access to NATO assets and capacities for civilian-military operations under the EU;

4. Procedures for releasing, monitoring, returning and recalling NATO capacities and assets;

5. Conditions for employing NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) for commanding EU-led operations;

6. EU-NATO consulting agreements in the context of EU-guided operations that make use of NATO assets and capacities;

7. Accords for a coherent and reciprocal reinforcement, most notably the inclusion in NATO defence planning of the military necessities and capacities that can be requested for military operations under the EU.

Concurrently, Member States charged Javier Solana, at that time HR, with developing a strategy for European security. The document then became a conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2003 Mr Solana produced a document entitled «A Secure Europe in a Better World», that for the first time analysed the European security context and identified the main challenges and the consequent political implications for Europe. In particular, he pointed out five menaces: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed States, and organized crime. The document also highlighted the existing interdependence and ties among these threats and between them and the whole international security context. The importance of preventing crises and conflicts in the close neighbourhood (Balkans, South Caucasus and Mediterranean area) by strengthening the order based on international rules to be implemented with the application of an effective multilateralism was also emphasised. In addition, the document, while reaffirming the significance of cooperating with NATO for managing crises (also given the impossibility of the EU to handle them alone), stressed the necessity for Europe to become more active in dealing with these challenges. Nonetheless, collaborating with the Alliance became even more crucial considering that the implementation of the Headline 2013 was not accomplished. Hence, in 2004 the European Council decided to establish a new goal (Headline Goals 2010): acquiring the capacity to respond in a quicker and more determining manner through a coherent approach able to cover the broad scope of the crisis management operations as established by the Petersburg Tasks. The Council also resolved to act before the eruption of a crisis by implementing preventive actions aimed at avoiding an escalation of the situation. Furthermore, the goal for the EU to carry on as many operations as possible simultaneously and at different levels of engagement was set. Hence, the idea of European Battle Groups was born, which is the creation of 13 highly responsive units, based on a voluntary participation, each made of 1.500 men, deployable in 10 days for operations lasting from 30 up to 120 days.

Given the scarce operational reactiveness of EU States to implement these provisions, in 2007 European leaders decided to give a new impetus to the so far declared arrangements by signing the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009. The Treaty emended and modified the two pre-existing Treaties on the European Union (TEU) and on the European Community (TEC), and substituted them with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The latter absorbed and expanded all the previous dispositions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy becoming the milestone for the development of nowadays Common Security and Defence Policy. The Lisbon Treaty, in fact, included a clause for mutual assistance and solidarity, which led to the configuration of a framework for: the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the expansion of the Petersburg Tasks and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)[28], the diplomatic service of the European Union under the authority of the High Representative. Operations of assistance, consulting, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization added to the operations the Petersburg Tasks authorised[29]. These new tasks were considered as appropriate for fighting terrorism and supporting other Countries, which were the victims of terrorism on their national territory. For what concerns the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), it enabled Member States that possessed military capacities able to satisfy the highest criteria and that were signatories of reliable deals with each other on defence, to carry on more demanding missions than the ones provided by the Treaty. The ratio of the PSC was to create the possibility for a further improvement of the development of the CSDP through a more effective EU role in the field of security and defence. The same line was followed by the incentives that were given to cooperate for reaching common goals concerning equipment expenses, harmonising defence apparatuses, coordinating the logistics and training (cooperation for which no minimum number of participant States was provided, instead the possibility to join the initiative was opened).

The previously mentioned Battle Groups, despite having reached full operative capacity on the 1st of January 2017, have never been deployed so far. This data should not be too surprising considering that, even if notable efforts were made for delineating the normative framework in which developing the European Battle Groups, the high level of cooperation requested to Member States was perhaps disregarded. Outlining the macro-coordinates (prevention and management of conflicts) for a European foreign policy was a great step in the context of the second pillar of the EU. Nonetheless, there has never been a concrete systematization and definition of which are the various real interests internal to the Union. The existing division between States more concerned

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28 This, always maintaining NATO's priority in exercising collective defence of Member States of both organizations.

29 As previously mentioned, the Petersburg Tasks authorised humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace-making operations.

on the eastern versus the southern front surely contributed to the lack of clarity on the matter. Furthermore, the jealous nationalisms that characterise the defence world have never allowed a future common commitment to be credible and reliable.

Notwithstanding the deadlocks, in 2016 the EDA improved the structure of the European defence policy by managing the European Defence Fund. The latter is designed to coordinate and amplify the efforts, capacities and investments of Member States' defence industries. It will help the States of the Union to spend taxpayer money in a more efficient manner therefore reducing duplications in spending. Overall, the Fund is aimed at becoming the engine powering the development of the European Security and Defence Union[30].

Conclusion

The analysis made in this paper clearly demonstrates that nowadays international security environment does not grant the European Union the luxury to remain a secondary actor on the global scene. The challenges and risks emerged in the past 10 years, in fact, force the Union to take up the responsibilities of being a global power, role acquired given the extremely high level of economic and social integration achieved. Despite throughout the years such a burden has stimulated an intense debate among EU leaders, Member States have always tended to refuse to take any step further and increase the defence and security scaffolding of the Union. Given both the present normative framework – and how its structure has evolved with time – and the formal operative readiness reached by the European Battle Groups, it is possible to argue that the hesitation Member States manifest is primarily due to two reasons: (1) the lack of a systematisation of national foreign and defence politics into a common synthesis; (2) the lack of a real integration of national defence capacities; (3) the lack of a EU budget to be devoted to military operations led by the Union. The division between Member States worried about the developments on the eastern front and those alarmed by the challenges emerged from southern flank is having implications on the debate on common defence and impedes these Countries to have trust in a solid and well structured foreign and defence policy. Equally important is the national military culture and the local traditions related to the deployment of Armed Forces that has developed throughout the years and changes from one State to the other. It is therefore necessary to find a common EU synthesis among those different customs and perspectives. The establishment of the European Defence Fund and the Rome Declaration represented a positive development. The Rome Declaration, in line

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30   «A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence capabilities,» European Commission, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm.

with articles 42 and 46 of the Lisbon Treaty[31], provides interested Member States with the possibility of starting the integration process. The Treaty, in fact, allows willing States to establish structures of permanent cooperation, named PESCO, on which to build a deeper form of integration on defence. The door is also left open to the remaining Member States in the case in which they are willing to join later on[32]. Since 2008 to nowadays, the activation of PESCO represents the first example of implementation of the decisions taken with a declaration. More generally, since 1992 it is the first time that real improvements are made for the development of a structural European common defence. Hence, what happened in Rome in May 2017 is a major advance in the European presence on the international scene and one can hope that the EU will take up responsibility not only for its security and defence, but also for the obligations that come from its status of global power. Moreover, it is likely that, as it often happens in these cases, the efforts of the most willing Countries will act as towing for the more sceptical and hesitant States. These last ones, in fact, fearing to be left behind and attracted by the possibility to gain more weight and credibility in the international arena, might decide to take part of the project. Nonetheless, the towing effect alone might not be sufficient for achieving a common foreign and defence policy. Pilot Countries will have to demonstrate the solidity of their willingness and of the cooperation project they intend to carry on. Finally, considering nowadays evolving of events, the Brexit might favour the development of a stronger Union in the field of defence. The United Kingdom, in fact, has always rejected the possibility to integrate the national security instrument into the broader EU context, also given its close relationship with the USA on the matter. As the process of departure of UK from the European Union progresses, a hindrance to a common European defence could fade away.

Given the purpose of this paper and the analysis made, the implementation of the following points is recommended for achieving a truly common foreign and defence policy, credible on the international scene and, therefore, able to pursue the interests of all Member States as unified in the international relations context:

1. Discussing and defining all the national interests and priorities present inside the Union for what concerns foreign policy, with the aim of identifying a minimum number of common interests to be pursed at the EU level. This path needs to be followed in order to delineate a shared direction to take for increasing integration and the Union's weight on the international scene.

31   For more info, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

32   For more info, see: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/protocols-annexed-to-the-treaties/673-protocol-on-permanent-structured-cooperation-established-by-article-42-of-the-treaty-on-european.html

2. The implementation of an integration programme for defence industries. Once the direction to take has been defined, in fact, the development of the tools needed for realising the objectives is of crucial importance. Hence, a strongly integrated defence sector represents the scaffolding of a common defence, headed by a defence and foreign policy.

3. Finally, harmonizing capacities and military tools in an integrated system represents the muscles of a solid and reactive instrument, which is ready to respond to nowadays challenges that are menacing the stability of the Union and to contribute to international peace.

Common conclusions (IEEE & Ce.S.I.)

Historical events that are taking place today within European borders or in its vicinity such as the Brexit, the migration movements, the war in Libya or the phenomenon of jihadist terrorism highlight the need for the European Union to develop a strong security and defence pillar. Furthermore, such necessity has become even more compelling considering that the new US administration under President Trump is shifting away its attention from the European continent and has explicitly asked EU States to take up responsibility for their own defence. In many occasions the EU has demonstrated its inability to respond to challenges emerging at its borders: the Balkan War in the 90´s implied NATO's actions because of the incapacity of the EU to tackle this problem; while the crisis in Libya of 2011-2012, once again showed a European Union that was not successful to prevent the demise of a dictator turning into a civil war. Moreover, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the instability of the Sahel, the migration crisis and the emergence of Daesh demonstrate that Europe is no longer the safe and stable place that 2003 EU Security Strategy spoke of. Evidently, it is time for the Union to take charge of defending its territory and project stability by launching the «Europe of the Defence» using the instruments provided by the Treaty of Lisbon, namely article 42: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). By proceeding in this direction, the EU will be able to speak out as a single voice, play an important role on the international scene, and strengthen its autonomy and credibility in the context of international security.

In order to develop this mechanism, four Countries took the lead: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Between November and December, the rest of the EU member States decided to join (with the exception of Malta, Denmark and the United Kingdom), raising the number of the signatories of PESCO to 25. Considering the important progresses made in the field of EU defence, this paper has tried to outline the following steps that need to be taken in order to achieve a comprehensive and efficient integration on the matter.

First, EU Countries necessitate to agree on a joint and combined chain of command deal wherein the responsibility to plan and conduct operations belongs to the EU that centralizes the capabilities provided by member States, in the same way that it is already carried out in bilateral agreements. For what concerns PESCO, it should be required that the agreements approved within its framework became coordinated, supervised and implemented by the Union itself, thus giving way to greater efficiency and effectiveness, and preventing the EU from being an overly slow bureaucratic mechanism incapable of taking decisions due to lack of consensus.

The next step is promoting integration in the industry of defence. The EU needs to act as a single actor in many areas to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency, and certainly the defence industry is one of those fields. Although it is a very complex

process to develop, there is no doubt that this will be one of the critical axes in the development of a credible and successful CSDP. First of all, it will be essential to identify national interests and those of the EU and to combine them. Thereafter, the European Defence Agency will have a fundamental role to play when it comes to reorganizing and restructuring the Defence industry, avoiding duplicities and reducing the number of heterogeneities that currently exist, while at the same time preventing unnecessary overlaps and loss of competitiveness in the markets. As the European Defence Agency itself mentioned, more than 100,000 million euros a year are wasted due to duplicities. Therefore, the EU Defence industry integrated projects will allow the EU to achieve a better and greater synergy.

Having already established which the Countries capable of participating in the development of capabilities and the deployment of European military missions are, a fully integrated and autonomous European projection and protection force capable of intervening either within the territory of the Union or beyond the borders of Europe in a very short period of time should be created. Initially, the current Battlegroups at Battalion level could be taken advantage of by employing them in real operations, both non-executive (such as training) and properly executive ones (combat operations). This should be done following a decision-making procedure that does not conflict with the activities already carried out by NATO and with a long-term perspective.

Although the EU is mainly a soft power, carrying out executive missions, when necessary, would send a clear message about the EU's willingness to assert its voice as an international actor. Some areas of the African continent in which the EU is already engaged might be an appropriate «training range» to test the EU operational capabilities as they evolve in order to improve them on the basis of the lessons learned and in view of more demanding operations. Furthermore, timelines should be established to reach each step in the process of building up better EU integrated military capabilities.

To properly finance all EU operations, it would be necessary to create a robust European Defence budget, which goes beyond the current Athena mechanism. In order to make this budget independent of national budgets, the extra commitments assumed by states to increase their defence budgets to 2% of GDP could be used.

In addition to this, the different national defence planning processes should be periodically reviewed and integrated into the European planning processes developed by the EU General Staff, in a similar way NATO has been doing for decades. This would provide a general and holistic overview of the EU and national Defence needs and would give the Union the capability to integrate EU and national defence spending and investments in acquisitions, research and capabilities development. Following this same direction, it should be a priority to create a permanent EU Headquarters at the operational level, independent of those offered by member States and that will be responsible for planning, coordinating and conducting all EU-led operations.

Regarding national Armed Forces, the procedures and doctrines of EU countries should follow the same guidelines so that their interoperability can be guaranteed at all times. European military academies and training courses could be integrated to ensure that military personnel acquires the same training regardless of the country of origin. A first step in this direction would be to generalize the military «erasmus» and increase the combined exercises of the military personnel of the different countries.

To sum up, it is important to stress that the consequences of not advancing in the PESCO and abandoning the project of rapidly integrating the EU Security and Defence policy might be extremely negative. On the one hand, Europe would turn more aggressively to the nationalisms that have done so much damage to the Union in the near past and that might appear more dangerously on the European soil.

On the other hand, the EU would lose the option and possibility of becoming an influential international actor at a time when strong powers such as China, India or the United States are assertively present on the world scene.

Finally, the economic factor cannot be underestimated. EU States need to reallocate resources and supply the Union with the additional capital it necessitates given the complexity of integrating EU defence. The lack of an appropriate economy of scale, the duplication of work when producing similar military capabilities at national level, the inefficient budgets to finance national projects, etc. will produce a clear loss of competitiveness in international markets, and a huge economic loss that EU nations cannot afford. Nonetheless, especially in the industrial field, inclusiveness should be the key word, as some States may struggle to integrate in the new system.

All these steps need to be carefully taken for ensuring the effectiveness and efficacy of a solid European defence able to guarantee security inside the Union and beyond.

Madrid, January 12. 2018

Composition of the working group

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